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The written testimony which was submitted for the
November 5, 1985 hearing of the Senate Select Committee on
Drug and Alcohol Abuse is attached. Due to technical
difficulties with the recording equipment, it is unfortunate
that we are unable to provide you with the actual transcript
of the hearing.
Should you desire further information relative to a
particular individual's testimony, ! . have included a list of
addresses of those who testified at the hearing.
I hope
that this list, in combination with the written materials
which were submitted, provides you with an adequate overview
of the clandestine lab and.designer drug problem.
Thank you for your interest in this very important
problem.
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MR.

FINAL DRAFT

11/4/85,

CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE

COMMITTEE~

;woo

THANK YOU

FOR · THLS OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY ON THE PRODUCTION OF ~LLEGAL
DRUGS PJ CALIFOHNIA.

CLANDESTINE LABS ARE ALREADY TqE NOST

SERIOUS DRUG PROBLEM
WORf.f~:

IN THIS STATE.

BY THE Dft:Y.

HISTORICALLY,

T.. I.Kfo: IIEHOIN, COCAINE,

BORD8RS.

'rim

CALIFORNIA HAS BEEN EASY PREY TO DRUGS
AND

i1ARIJUAl~A

WITHIN THE PAST DECADE,

THAT FLOH EAS.ILY li.CR03S OUR

HOWEVER,

A NEW AND OMINOUS

ChLIFORNIA liAS. BECOME A MlhlOR SOURCE S.TA~rE

TREND liAS gr·1EHGF.D.
"FOH

AND THE PROBLEM IS GETTING

-PRODUCTION OF If.. f.. EGAL DRUGS.
DOMESTIC PR8DUC'l'ION OF MARIJUANA BAS DRAv,lN THE MOST

ATTENTION WrTHIN THE STATE.

THE DIVERSION AND ABUSE OF

PIU~SCRII ; TION

DRUGS IS EQUALf.. Y SERIOUS,

PUBLICIZim.;.

BU'l' PERHAPS 'l'HI:: MOST SERIOUS PROBLEl-1 OI•' ALL

CLANDL·:S'J'INE MANUFACTURE
MORE fmCC:NTLY,
AS

0~'

P.C.P.,

THOuG ~ l

L.S.D.,

LESS \'JELL
IS TBE

ME'1'HAt-1l>HETAl>1INE AND .,

TilE \\IHOLg Pl1.NOPLY OF SYNTHETIC NP.RCO'l'ICS KNO\'lN

"DESIGNER DRUGS."
'l'r~N

RET~J\'l~lVELY.

RJ\'l'g.

YE.Z\RS AGO OUH CLANDES'fiNE LABORATORY PIWBLEM 'ilAS

MOD·gST.

· f'OH. 'rHE PAST

'fill:: l1J\NlJli'AC'l'URE Of'
DHLJ~;

ENI"ORCEMI:~NT

BUT

:r.•r

'f~'/0

ygARS,

rr.r.. ICIT

l3l~EN

HAS

GRONING AT A FEARSOME

CT\LIPORNIA HAS

NARCOTICS.

Al1l'\INJ.STH.I\'l'ION,

Nl·:Rg SBJZED N/\'l'ION\-JlJ)g IN 1984.
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r.. rm 'fHE NATION IN

ACCO~WING

312 CT...J\NDgSTINE

orm

'fO 'fHE U.S.
LABORATORH~S

HUNDIU:O OF THOSE,

NEARLY

ONE-THIRD OF THE TOTAL,
AND,

WERE SEIZED RIGIIT HERE IN CALIFORNIA.

,,

IN TRUTH,

NUMHERS SUGGES'f.

THE SITUATION

IS MUCH WORSE THAN THOSE

ONE OF THE tt'RUSTRA'fiONS OF FIGHTING

CLANDESTINE LARS IS THRLACK OF RELIABLE DATA.
I

LEGISLATION THAT

SPONSORED LAST YEAR WILL EVENTUALLY SOLVE THAT PROBLEM.

BUT

FOR NOW WE ARE GROPING IN THE STATISTICAL DARK.
CON'l'RAST,
TO TilE D.E.A.

f.<'OR EXAMPLE 1

THE 100 LAR SEIZURES REPORTED

LAST YEAR WI'l'H THE RESUL'fS OF A POf,fJ OF FIVE
S'fATf~:

MAJOR FOrU:NSIC LABORA'rORIES AROUND Tl·m
LABS SEIZED AND ANALYZED

THEY 'REPORT F:D 183

IN CALIFORNIA LAST YEAR~

AND

222 MORE

SO FAR THIS YEAR.
EVEN THOSE NUMBERS PROBABLY SUBSTANTIALfJY UNDE1{C0UNT
'l'O'rAL SEit:lJRgE.
THREE THAT

F'IND,

'l'HERE ARF.: /\'£ LEAS'!'

WE MISS.

AS THIS CHAHT INDICA'fi!:S
f,ABf~

\-m

AND FOR EVERY LAB

1

E1\CH ONE OF TllESg HUNOHE:DS

IS CAPABLE Of•' CHURNING OUT AN

0~'

IN2REDIBLE VO!JLIME Of

NARCOTIC!:i o
13EGINNING IHTH A BARRgL OF EPHEDRINE l'JEIGHHJG

]10 POUNDS AND COSTING hBOUT $17 1 000 A TYPICAL LAB CAN "COOK"
ABOUT 100 POUNDS OF PURE

NE:'rHAMPHE'rAr1INi~

MONTH.

BE

THIS IN TU1{N C/\N

~JO!t'l'H

[,ABS COME IN
EXAMPLE,

\~IIICll

200,000 GRAMS.

COURSl<: OJ? f.·,

$60 A

AT ROUGHLY

$12 MILLION.
.\[~L

DI FF8Rf~NT SIZES.

IS DY NO !•mANS ATYPICAf..

'l'HAN T\~0 Mir.. f,lON DOSES OL~
ROLL OtJ'I' OL;- A f'INGLE

Till~

"CUT" INTO 400 POUNDS OF THE

s ·rREE'f-S'l'RENG'fB DHUG - - ABOUT

GRMl I'l' \WUfJD BE

OVER

1

YOU

BUT l.''HOt1 TlilS
Cl~N

SEE THAT MORE

"SPEED 11 \'JOR'N! ovgR $lAO MILLION COUI,D

[Jl\DORATO~~y

IN A SlNG£,E YEAR.

KIND OF 1'-lONlW J\ND 'l'IIA'r KlND OF VOLU!·\E,
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YOU

BEGI~'J

WITH

TO

Gl~'l'

TIIAT

A

S~Nsg

OF . WHAT w~ - rRE UP AGAINST HERE~
I

AS lF THAT WEREN 1 T DAD ENOUGH,
'i'AKitl~;

'A Q!JAN'l'Ur1 LEAP

THE LAB PROBLEM IS

IN SOPHISTICATION Mm DANGER WITH '.rHE NEW

CHlmiCAL •.rgCEJNOLOGY OF SO-CALLED
GETTING 200,000 DOSES OF

"DESIGNER DRUGS • ."
"SPEED" FROM 100 POUNDS OF

PU Rg MB'l'llAMPHE'rAMINE IS PENNY AN'rE S'.rUFF IN THE
Dt-~SIGNrm

DRUGS.

\~ORLD

OF

A SINGLE TE.ASPOON 01:' PURE SYNTHE'.riC HE ROil~

WILL YIELD UP TO TWO MILLION DOSES.
TH~SE

• MANUFACTURING
FROM

~COOkiNG" P.C.P.,
~BING

CUilRENTLY
Ol~LY

DRUGS IS NOT ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT

METHAMPHBTA~INE AND OTHER SUUSTANC~S

MASS PRODUCED
IN
.
.

CALIFO~NIA
..
.

LABORATORIES.

Rgl\L . DIF.F ICU[,TY. IS THAT EVEN TINY ERRORS IN

THE

".CUTTI·NG"

TliF: S t:: ' P0\'1E£U;'UL C01.'1POUNOS C.l\N t-1EAN DEATH BY OVERDOSE.
·A · HUNDnGD CALIFORNIANS HAVE ALREADY DIEO AS A RESULT.

MOJ1.F: 'l'HJ\N
AND

lWNilHEDS f110fH-~ Hl\VE SUFFERED PERM!I.NEN'l' BRAIN DAr-1AGI.:~.
OCSPITg TUE DANGERS, . H0\'1EVER 1 IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF
TIME UEPORE THg T~CHNOLOGY BECOMES WIDESPREAD AND CALIFORNIA
I!'LOOIH~D

IS

Hl 'fll SYNTHE'l'IC HEROIN.
THA'r OPENS liP SOME

FROM MEXiCO &ND TURKEY,

'l'gRRI~'YING

FOR ~XAMPhE,

. INTEREST ONLY TO HISTORIANS.
'!'liE HlPOfi'l'S.

VIS'rAS.

HEROIN HlPOR'J'S

MAY BECOME MATTERS OF

HOMEMADE · PRODUCTION WILL DWARF

AND !H:ROIN COULD B·ECOME AS CHEAP -AND RF.ADH,Y

AVAlLAnLE.AS CA~DY.
I

SUPPOS~

01" P/\YM8N'1'Ei.

THIS WILL -ALL bE VERY GOOD FOR OUR DALANCE

BUT I'l' HILL BE A CA'.rAS1'ROPUE FOR OUR WAY OF

SO WI.:'; llAVl!: A
~WRSI~

PROJlL~~M,

IIY 'riJF! DAY, . AND ON

'.rl!l.~!

A VERY sgRIOUS PROBLEM!

GE'l"l'ING

VERGE OF A QUANTm1· LI':/\P INTO 1\ .
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TRULY DISASTROUS SITUATION.

THE QUESTION NOW IS WHAT CAN WE
I•

DO?
WHEN MOST DRUGS WERE IMPORTED

IT WAS TRADTIONALLY A
TIIEIJ~

l''EDEHJ\L RESPONS HH J, I'l.'Y TO FIGHT THEM A'l.'

NO LONGEH 'l'RUE.

E-'IWfmAI. C;QVEHNMEN'f CAN AND tHLL HELP US.
WAY TO ATTACK IT WITH STATE AND LOCAL
NOR CAN WE

RXPEC~

BUT WE MUST FIND A

RESOURCES.

DEAT~ING

IN 'l'I!EIR

OI~N·

AND 'i'IIEY !lAVE THEIR HANDS FUI,L A'f THAT LEVEL.

IS Ll'l'TLE TO SP/'"RE IN THE

~'lAY

OF 1"1ANPOWER 1\ND RESOURCES

LABS.

J;-OH BUS'l' JIJG

SECONDLY

1

DEALING WI'l'tl

VERY COriPLICATED AND

DANG!~HOUS

CLhlWESTilH~

WORK.

LIGHTI,Y ··- AND NCVER BY PmXPERIENCED
OFL''ICEHS.

THE

LOCAL AUTHORITIES HAVE TRADITlONALLY

FOCUSED m1 CON'rROLLING STHECT-I,EVEL

TllERE

BORDERS.

LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TO SHOULDER

FIRST OF ALL,

JURISDIC'flONS.

. THAT IS

'1.'111-.: f1AtHWJ\CTURE CW DRUGS IN Cl,ANDESTINI:': [,J\BS

TAK8S PLACE ALMOST ENTIRELY WITHIN OUR OWN

TilE nORDEN.

SOURCES.

EVEN HALKING

ATTACKING A HEAVILY
OJ.o' DEADLY •roXtNS.

AND

BVEI~

'l~O

IT

IS NOT

Ol~

UN'rRAINED POLICE
r~ABORA'rORY

IN'l'O A DESER'l'ED

DEF~NUED

L.Z\BORATORIES IS
BE ATTeMPTED

-- MUCH LESS

ONE -- RISKS EXPLOSION AND RCLEASE
AF'rER A LAB HAS

BEI~t·i

SEIZED,

CJ.. El\NING UP '1'1!1:: SI'l'E AtW SECURING THE EVIDENCE ARE
EXTRAORDINARILY
'rHE

DI~fiCULT

T~li\Bif,

AND DANGEROUS.

I'rY H1Pf,IC/\'l'IONS ALONE ARE HIND-BOGGLING FOR

LOCAL AU'rllORI'.!.' lES -- 110'1'11 FHm1 DANGER '1'0 SUHROLJNDING HOME:S AND
CI'fiZI~NS,

AND l"ROM

Di\'t~GI~~R

'l'O Ll\W ENFORCEI.'Jc-:N•r EMPLOYEES.

EVEN 'l'lm [,1\H.CES'r POLICE IJEPAR'rr-JEN'l'S NEED
TRAINED SQUADS
A'f

~OR

THIS KIND OF WORK.

ALr~.

-4-

SPi'~CIJ\LT.. Y

SMALL ONES CANNOT DO IT

.

BUT THE MAIN REASON THAT LOCAL JURISDICTIONS CANNOT
,·

EFFECTVELY CONTROL CLANDESTINE LABS IS THAT THE PROBLEM
ROUTINELY CROSSES JURISDICTIONAL LINES.
.

.

ON THIS MAP WE'VE MARKED THE LOCATIONS AND THE
"PRODUCTS OF CLANDESTINE LABORATORISS SEIZED IN CALIFORNIA IN .

1984.

YOU WILL NOTICE THAT THERE ARE SOME INTERESTING REGIONAL

VARIATIONS.

THE MANUFACTURE OF P.C.P. IS COMMON IN THE SOUTH,

..

PARTICULARLY IN LOS ANGELES COUNT~, _BUT VIRTUALLY bNKNOWN IN
THE NORTH.
COMMONLY

Ml~THAI'1PH~TAMINE

P~ODUGBD

NOTIC~,

ON THE OTHER HA.ND 1 IS MOR~

1

NORTH OF THE TEHACHIPIS.
TOO, THAT ~HE MANUFACTURING SITES ARE SPREAD
T~ERR

RATHER EVKNLY AROUND THE STATE.
Sl\N DIEGO, LOS

ANGr~LES

A~E

A NUMBER IN .

AND THE BAY AREA, BUT MORE ARE LOCATED

IN TilE RURAL COUNTIES SURROUNDING TilE HETROPOLITAN AREAS.
THERE'S -NO MYSTERY AS TO NHY THIS IS SO.

THE LABS ARE

CLOSE TO METRbPLITAN AREAS B6CAUSE THAT'S WHERE THEY GET THEIR
SUPPT~IES

AND SHIP

THE~R

FINISHED PRODUCTS.

BUT 'rHEY PREFE:R

. RUR/\L AREAS BECAUSE LABORATORY SMELLS, CUSTOMER COMINGS AND
.

.

GOINGS, AND OCCASIONAL EXPLOSIONS ARE LESS LIKELY TO -DRAW
ATTENTION THERE TKAN IN THE MIDDLE OF DENSELY POPULATED URBAN
~I!:IGHDORHOODS.

AND -BECAUSE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES ARE USUALLY ·
S'l'RF.'l'C.IlF.D VERY Til IN IN RURAfJ AREAS 1 THE CHANCES OF POLICE
INTElU'ElU!:NCE ARE . MUCH LOWER THAN
SO THE

r~OCATION

~N

TH 8 CIT·Y.

OF .TilE LABS THEMSELVES IS NOT REALLY A

GOOD INDICATION OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF PROBLEM.
INS'rRUC'riVE IS WHAT HAPPENS '1'0
LABS.

WHEN NE CHART 'rHAT,

~·m

Tlll~

SI'~E.

-5-

MORE

DRUGS AFTER 'l'HJ:;Y [,EAVE TilE
'rliAT NO f1ATTER WHERg THE I.ABS

ARE LOCA'rED, '!'HEIR Sll I PPING LINES LEf\D STRAIGHT TO '£HE BAY
AREA,

SACRAMENTO,

IS RINGf;J) WI'rll

FRESNO,

LOS ANGELES OR SAN DIEGO.

EACH CITY

ITS OWN LI'l"l'LB CIRCLE OF HIGH VOr,ur-m POISON

DI SPlmSJmS.
AND THERE 1 S ANO'l'HER PART OF THE PIC'I'URE TO CONSIDER:
THE FLm-J 01:, PRECURSOR CHEMICALS.

MANY OF 'rHE CHEMICALS USED TO

MANUFJ\C'l' IJRE NAHCOTICS ARE COMHON.

MOST HAVE r.EGI'riMA'l'E

INDUS'fRIAL USES.

VIR'rUALf,Y ALL ARE PRODUCED IN URBAN AREAS.

NO'l' SURPRISINGI.Y,

\•JHEN HE CHART TilE FL0\'1 OF PRECURSOR CHEMICALS

WE SSF: TIIA'l' THE TRAFFIC IS ONE-\-JAY FROM 'l'HE CITIES,
PARTICULARLY FROM THE BAY AREA,

AND

TO THE RURAL COUNTIES.

CLEARLY 'J.'IJ IS IS A PROBLEI'-1 THAT EXT E NDS F/\R BEYOND 'I' liE
REACH OF ANY LOCAL JURISDICTION.

IT IS AN ENDLESS CYCLE FROM

UIWJ\N CHE1'1ICAL Pf.ANTS 'fO RURAL Ll\T30RA'l'OIHES AND 0/\CK '1'0 URBM,1
DRUG MARKETS -- A DEADLY,
SYS'l'E 1 THA'l'

I~EAVgs

EFFICIENT AND LUCRATIVE DISTRIBUTION

NO NEIGIJnORHOOD IN 'filE S'I'A'_rE UNTOUCHED.

OUR ONLY HOPB FOR GETTING A HANDLE ON CLANDESTINE L/\BS
IS /\

S~RONG,

rmFORCEM£~N'l'.

COOPERATIVE EFFORT AMONG ALL LEVELS OF LAW
AND IT IS QUITE CLRAR THAT 'l'i-IE I<;Fr,ORT HUST BE

COO lWlHA'fED AT THE S'fA'rE Ll::VEL.
'rllgRE ARE A NUMi3ER Of:' 'l'IIINGS THAT \'IE CAN DO A'f
STAT~

LEVEL,

AND I

THE

WANT TO DEAL WITH THEM IN SOME DETAIL.

BUT

LET ~1E S'rRESS RIGHT UP FRONT THAT THEim ARE NO EASY OR
INEXPENSIVE ANSWERS.
PASSING

SOr-11~:

NgW

PU'r'riNG

~101{8

~10NEY

Lg•r

~IE

LA\~S.

WB CANNOT SOLVE TillS PROBLEM SIMPLY BY
\~E.

1

RI:":

INTO DRUG

GOING TO

'l'lll~

'1'0 SQ[,Vf!: IT· BY

ENFOH.CEMI ~ N · r.

GIVE. YOU AN EX1\MPI.E.

PRECURSOH CON'l'l{()f, £,1\\•J.::i HI

JlAVf~

COUN'l'RY.

-6-

CA[,II.-'ORNIA liAS TilE f\ES'r
OUR LAW HEUlliHES

CHEMICA[, WHOLESALf~RS •ro REPORT TO 'fH~ · DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ALL
SALES OF SPECIFIC PRECURSORS.

FAILURE TO REPORT RESULTS

IN

CRIMINAL PENALTIES.
AND, WITH

SOME . NOTABLE . EXC8PTIONS,

INDUSTRY HAS BEEN VERY COOPERATIVE.
CI~ASED

THE CHEMICAL

SOME COMPANIES HAVE SIMPLY

Ml,NUFACTURING CF,:RTAIN CONTROLLED CHEI'HCALS WITH A HIGH

POTENTIAL FOR USE IN CLANDESTINE DRUG LABS.
IN OTHER CASES
IHPOH'I~

1

·IT, LEGAL LABS I·IAVE BEEN . FORCED TO

.

CHEI"liCALS. FR0!-1 O'rHER STAT·ES WHICH HAVE NOT HAD A

PRECURSOR ~EPORTING S1STEM.

PRECURSOR CONTROL ~AS PROVEN

ITSELF A VALUABLE DETERRENT.
YET WE ARE USING THIS TOOL TO ONLY A FRACTION OF ITS
NI.TlJ OVER 2, 000 CHEMICAL WHOL ESI\I,.f.n~s AND RETAILERS

POTgN'l'IJ\L.
IN

'l'HI~

S'l~ATE

~<IE

RECEIVED ONLY 200 REPOR'l'S ON PRECURSOR

CIIEMICALS LAST YEAR.
NO'f

rm

fl.NALYZIW.

AND THOSE REPORTS WE DID .RECEIVE COULD

YE'l' ,EXPERIENCE liAS SHO\'lN THAT CAREFUL

ANALYSIS WOULD PAY OFF HIG IN GOOD LEADS AND,

ULTIMA~ELY,

IN

LAR SIUZURES.
WHY ARE WE OPERATING THIS WAY?

.

THg ANSWER IS

'

PAINFULLY SIMPLE.

WITH EXISTING MANPOWER,

WE CAN INVESTIGATE

[,ESS '!'111\N ONE-FOURTH OF THE GOOD LEADS WE HAVE NOW ..
REPOR'l'S AND

\'m

BL~·r•rgR

~10RE.

ANALYSI.S WOULD ONLY PRODUCE MORE LEADS TliA'l'

COlH.. D NOT FQl',LO\A7 UP.

SO WE HAVE BAD TO FACE THE UNPLEASANT

CHOICE OF PUTTING MORE M1\NPOW8R INTO ENFORCEMENT AND LEgs INTO
PRECURSOR CONTROL.
TWO Yl!!ARS AGO,

REA'f,IZING 'l'HAT \olE FACED A GRO\\'ING

L1\nORA'l'ORY PROI3L EM IN C i\I, I '1:-'0RNIA,
PlmSOt~Nf::T,.

I

RI~QU

gs•rrm

P.DD I'l' !ONJ\f..

t-IE IH:CfnV f::D AU'I'IIOIH ZA'I'JON FOR ONI, Y '1'8N J\DD ITIONAL

-7-

AG~NTS.

SO

I

P~RSONNEL

STRIPPED ADDITIONAL

IMPORTANT NARCOTICS

INVESTIGATIONS

~0

FRO~

FORM A

OTHER

SP~CIAL

TEAM FOR

LAB INVESTIGATIONS.
DURI~G

198~

ASSIGN~D

W8

FlJf,r, 'fiME •ro 'l'IIIS El~FOR'J'.
AND

cr_,OSI~IJ

AN

AVf~HAGE

REQll IRING AH

33

Li\B CASES BY

AT 437

RRSOURCES.

'l'UAT DOESN 1 'f BE:GIN ·ro Tld<E
BE GE:NERA'rED 'l'IIROUGJl
ANY ql1Y YOU

Till~

CLOSED CASES,

l"OH LACK OF

AND

HANY I.EADS THAT COUI.,D

f.OOK AT

I'r,

L8Vl~L

MUJ

CALil',ORNIA

IS

BADJ,Y

r.,(>R DBALING 'VH'l'H 'l' HI.::SF.:
DIF' l•'ICUL'r

l.N\'ESTIGATIONS.

\vi'~

ENFORCI:.mENT AGEN'l'S '1'0 POPULA'£ION,

OL~

BO'l"l'ON

THESE

69 PERSONNE.rJ YEARS.

l\ TJOOK .l\T HO\•l HE CmlPARE 'EO 0'£Hl~R S'rATt::S.

Dl~UG

B.N.E.

~ACKLING

HOURS P8H CASE,

Itl'l'O COUNT THE

EX'rHAORIHIP\IUf_,\.' COf'lPl·ICA'.rED
TAI~E

EACH CASE

P I\.Ol'ER .1\NALYSIS OF OUR PRECUilSO.K CASES.

UNUJ·:ItSTAFI;'ED ll'r 'rilE: S 'l't'. 'l'E

OF S'rA'J'E

\'H'rll

OF 437 AGEN'l'-HOURS ..

LABS WOUT_,D HAVE REQUIRE:D AN ADDITIONAL

f_,ET 1 S

REPORT,

317 CASES TllA'r \•1E COLlLDN ''r INVBSTIGA'r g

MANPOWER AND

24 AGENTS

58 CLANDES'riNE r_.!\13S

'rilE 'rEMl SEIZED

ADDITIOH TO 'l'IIE TOTAL Or, 91

IN
IDJo:N'~H'IED

ADDITION1\L

THE EQUIVALENT OF

'l'IIE T...IS'l' ---

BOTH At-10NG THE NATION

1

IN

RA'l'IO

M1.E 'l.'OWARD

S Lfi.RGE STATES

AND At10NG OUH tmAR NEIGHBORS.
ARIZONA AND HC:\•1 MEXICO IlAVg

SThTE AGENTS PER CAPITA.
'fill~

COUt~'l'l<'i

liAS

MORI~

~H'l'H

S'J~A'fE

JUHl~DIC'l'IONJ\£J

BUHE/\ll 01!'

AND TEXAS,

WHICH

IS T•IE

O~LY

A Cr,ANfH:.!S'fiNE LAB PROAL EM COMPARt.I3Lg

'l'llAN 'r\-HCE: A:J
miY

J?IVE TO SEVEFJ 'rll'lES MORE

~1ANY

AGEN'l'S

l~Glm'rS?

C!\~1~~1

13ECAUSJ~

P~~R

STATE IN

•ro

OURS,

CAPI'fA Tlli\N CAT.,I.FORNIA.

\'li.; ARE DEAT.ING \VITH

MUTf.. I -

HEOUITUNG A COOHDINA'rED EFFOH'r NITH OUR

l''OHEN;>I C Sl·: I{VtCES

1

'l'fllln'EgN
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H.~:GIONi\L

CRH\1·; [,1\BS.

wg CAN cgRTAINLY ST.ICE. TilE , PIE

BY ABANDONING OUR

~IGHT AGAINST HARD
0

DIFFERI'~NTLY

DRUG,

,AT B.N.t::.,

BY ABANDONING

0

PltRSCRIPTION DRUG DIVERSION ENFORCEMENT,
MAR! HUANA EAlWICATION EFFOR'l'S.

AND BY ABANbONING

Dil'r THA'l' i"1AKES NO sgNSE.

THE

F'ACT IS 'l'IIA'r OUR PIE IS TOO SMALL WITH 13UT 115 NON-SUPERVISING
AGENTS IN ALL OF

B~N.E.

AND 'fHE PROBLE!'-1 IS EVEN \-JORSE IN OUR RURAL AREAS
BECAUSE I,OCAL RESOURCES ARE STRE'fCHED so THIN.
op · 'fliiS Clll\H'.r

You • r,r. SEE THAT,

LOCJ\T, S\'WHt-J' OFI!'ICER
AR~AS

~'OR

AT THE BOT'l'OM

ON THE AVERAGE,

TIIERE IS ONE

gvERY 414 CITY RESIDf.NTS.

IN RORAI,

THERE'S ONE LQCAL OFFICER FOR EVERY 615 PEOPLE.
P80PL~ 1

NO'l' ONLY DO RURAL OF'FICERS SERVg !'lORE
t1US'l' COVFm SUBS'fANT[ALI,Y NORE TERRITORY.

THEY

THERE IS ONE OFFICgR,

FOR EVERY 2-SC)UARE MITJES OF U rm .n.N TERRI'l'ORY IN THE STATE.
H.URA.L ArmAS THE c'IGURE: IS 60 SQUARE: t-1ILES PER Of.'FICER.

IN

NOvj YOU

CAN BEGIN TO SEE \'7llY CLANDES'l'INE Li\BS LOCATE IN RURAL AREAS ·

EVEN THOUGH THEIR

SUPPLIER~

AND THEIR MARKETS ARE IN THE

CI'l'IES.
I

AM IN THE PH.OCr.;ss OF PREP/\RING FOR THE LEGISf,l\TURE 1 S .

CONSIDERATION A MAJOR PACKAGE ~0 ADDUESS THE CLANDRSTINE
LABORATORY PROFH.EM.

THE PROGRAM WILL

MANUP.l\C'fUHING PROCESS FROM
THE GANK.

~T

Clli.'~MICl\.L

TARGE~~

'filE: EN'fiRE

PRECURSORS TO PROFI'l'S . IN

EVERY STEP ALONG THE WAY WE'RE GOING TO INTERVENE

TO MAKE LII!'E MISERAUT.r.; FOR TilE DRUG
AS •rlJE r.. EGI_sr.ATION rs

1'1f.:~RCBAN.'fS.

nsvr::r.tn. c:n

WE

\Ur.r., OF

FOIU-JARD l'f IN DE'fAIL TO TilE Ll·;GISLATUHE •. BU'r I
YOU

l\.~

OVERVIEW TODAY OF THE

ST~PS
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WE WILL

·B~

couRsE,

DO \'JAN'l' TO GIVE

PROPOSING. ·

\iE BEGIN WITH A GREATLY S'l'RENGTIIENEI> PRECURSOR

CONTROLS PROGRAM.

THE FIRST REQUIREMENT HERE IS AN AGGESSIVE

EFFORT USING AUDITORS TO REVIEW CHEMICAL SALES RECORDS AND
INSURE PROPER REPORTING COMPLIANCE.
THEN WE WILL NEED A STRONG CADRE OF APPROXIMATELY FOUR
ANALYSTS TO COMPUTERIZE THE REPORT DATA, ANALYZE IT, AND
GENERATE LEADS ON Ll\BORATORIES THROUGHOUT THE STATE.
SURROUNDING STATES ARE GRADUALLY BRINGING THEIR
PRECURSOR REPORTING

L~WS

IN LINE WITH CALIFORNIA'S.

NOW, WE CAN GREATLY INCREASE THE EXPENSE AND THE
OBTAINING THESE CHEMICALS.

IF WE ACT
OF

DANG~N

AND WE MAY WELL DRIVE MANY

L~B

OPERATIONS OUT OF THE STATE.
AS I'VE ALREADY MENTIONED, IT IS POINTLESS TO GBNERATE
NEW LE/\L>B IF wg DOH 1 '1' BAVt!: THE AGEN'.L'S TO f''OLI. . 0\'1 TIIEM UP.

WE

MUST SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASC ENFORCEMENT IN THE FIELD.
THEREI!'ORE. 1 I WILL PHOPOSE '.L'liE CREATION OF A I..AB TAGK FORCE IN
EACH OF OUR SEVEN FIELD OFFICES AROUND THE STATE.
IN ADDITION TO

INV~STIGATIN G

LEADS GENERATED BY

PRECURSOR ANALYSIS, THE TASK FORCE S WILL COORDINATE AND
COOPERATE IN EFFORTS BY LOCAL AND FEDERAL OFFICIALS.
IMPORTANT TUOUGH IT IS TO REINFORCI:': B. N. E.
CANNOT l1ND SIJOlll.. D HO'f REPLACE LOCAL EFr'ORTS.

1

THAT

THEREFORE WE

PROPosg '£0 !NVES'r HEAVILY IN STRENG'l'BENING LOCAL LAW
ENFOKCEMENT'S WORK IN THIS AREA.
FIRST,
LOCAL AGEN'fS

~8

Uf~C0t-1E

PRECAUTIONS FOR LAU

WILL

ST~P

UP OUR TRAINING PROGRAM TO HELP

PHOr'lCIENT IN 'fHF: TECHNIQUES AND SAFETY
INVESTIG~TIONS.
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, .

WE WILL ALSO PROPOSE AN IN9ENTIVE

FU~D

TO ENCOURAGE

LOCAL JURISDICTIONS •ro TAKE ON · THESE .DIFFICULT AND EXPENSIVE
CASBS.

AS IT STANDS NOW, WITH SO MANY OTHER SERIOUS DRUG

PROBLEMS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, AND WITH EACH LAB INVESTIGATION
INVOLVING HUNDREDS OF HOURS 1 THERE IS A REAL DISINCENTIVE '1'0
TACKLE THEM.
WE IIOPE 'fO

BY HELPING TO EASE THE BURDEN ON LOCAL BUDGETS,

HET~P

FOCUS MORE

r~OCAL

RESOURCES AND EFFORT ON THE

PROBLEM.
ONCE STATE ' OR LOCAL -OFFICIALS HAVE TAKEN

D~WN

A LAB( .

THEY FACE THE PROBLEM OF STORING AND
ANALYZING THE EVIDENCE.
.
.
.
.
THEREFORE, WE WILL INCLUDE TWO TRAINED CRIMINALISTS ON EACII LAB
TASK FORCE, TOTALLING FOURTEEN STATEWIDE.
Tim

AND WE WILL PROPOSE

CREI\.'riON OF SEVERAL FACILITIES AROUND THE STATE FOR SAFE

S'l'OHAGL;; OF' LAB EVIDENCE.
I SHOULD ALSO MENTION THAT, AS PART OF OUR ONGOING
Pi:OGHM1 •ro .UPGRADE

TH~

S'rA'.l'E 1 S FORENSIC LABORA'fORIES vJE HAVE

RECOMMENDED CREATING THE CALIFORNIA CRIMINALISTIC INSTITUTE.
ONE OF C.C.I. 1 S KEY FEATURES WOULD DE THE ABILITY TO ANALYZE
SYNTIIE'fiC NARCOTICS.

CURRENTLY ONLY n'10 LABS IN· THE COUNTRY

CAN DO THIS WORK-- ONE . OF THEM AT U.C. DAVIS.
LAST WEEK ALONE THERE WERE BELIEVED TO BE FIVE
OVI~RDOSE

DEATHS

1~1Wl1

SYNTHETIC HEROIH IN SAN FRANCISCO.

DEMANDS F6R LABORATORY ANALYSIS ARE SKYROCKETING.
GE'l' BY MUCH

r~ONGER

'fHE

WE CANNOT

vHTH ONLY ONE FACILITY.

NEXT WE COME TO THE PROnLEM OF CLEANOP AFTER A LAB IS
SEIZED.

'l'IHS IS NOT

MF.:RET~Y

MJ\JOH gNVI HONNt::N'fA[. liAZARD.
'1'0 CLI::/\N UP

1~/\CH

A .LAt-1 ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM, ,I'r 1 S A
IT COSTS

Ri'~'fWEEN

$3000 AND $5,000

Or. . THESE 11INI-'f0XIC \·lAS'rF: Sl'l'gS.
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JI.NO

II~

THl:!

CLEANUP IS NOT PROPERLY HANDLED, THE ' CONSEQUENCES CAN BE VERY
SERIOUD INDEED.

AGAIN, TilE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CLEAN-UP

CAN BE A DISINCENTIVE TO INVESTIGATING THESE CASES.
HAVING CRIMINALISTS ON THE TASK FORCES WILL HELP WITH
T~IS

PROBLEM.

BUT WE WILL ALSO PROPOSE A STATE-ADMINISTERED

TRUST FUND TO IIELP REIMBURSE LOCAL AGENCIES FOR CLEANUP COSTS.
TUE. NEXT PROBLEM IS PROSECUTION.

AND, UNFORTUNATELY 1

THIS IS OFTEN A POINT WHERE THE WAR AGAINST CLANDESTINE LABS
BREAKS DOWN.

AGAIN, TIIESE ARE COMPLICATED DIFFICULT CASES.

STATE LAW IS LESS FAVORABLE THAN FEDERAL LAW FOR THEIR
PROSECUTION, AND LOCAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS SOMETIMES FAIL TO
PRESS THEM TO TRIAL.
WE WILL PROPOSE A MAJOR NEW STATE DOLLAR COMMITMENT TO
LOCAL PROSECU'riON OF THESE CASES.
REVIEW OF SENTENCING.
LAW ON JANUARY FIRST

AND WE WILL ALSO ENCOURAGE A

A.B. 275 1 SPONSORED BY MY OFFICE, BECAME
o~·

'rHIS YEAR.

IT RAISED THE SENTENCE FOR

MANUFACTURING DRUGS TO A MAXIMUM OF SEVEN YEARS IN STATE PRISON
AND CREATED THE PRESUMPTION, THOUGH NOT THE CERTAINTY, THAT
SENTENCES WILL INCLUDE PRISON TIME.
THAT WAS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AND WE SHOULD
DO WIIATEVER CAN BE DONE TO IMPOSE HEAVY CRIMINAL PENALTIES AS
WELL.
THE FINAL STEP IN THE PROCESS IS GOING AFTER THE
PROli'I'fS OF TilE DRUG MERCHAN'fS.

WE ARE TODAY BUILDING ASSET

FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS INTO EVERY LAB CASE.

TO MAKE SURE IT'S

DONE AND DONE RIGHT, HE PLAN 'fO INCI.. UDE AN AUDI'fOR ON EACH OF
OUR SEVEN PLANNED CLANDESTINE LABORATORY TASK FORCES.
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THAT BRINGS UP THE QUESTION • OF

COSTS~

MY ESTIMATR IS

THAT 'rHE PROGRAM I HAVE OUTLINED HERE TODAY CAN BE IMPLEMEN'rgD
FOR ROUGHLY $9 MILLION PER YEAR.

BUT I \'JAN'r TO EMPHASIZE TIIA'r

THE NET COSTS WILL DE SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER.

FEDERAL ASSET

FORFEITURE LAWS -- AND, I WOULD HOPE, IMPROVED STATE LAWS - AS
WELL -- SHOULD PAY PART OF THE COST.
ONE OF THE DISCOURAGING THINGS ABOUT

DRU~

ENFORCEMENT

IS THE CONSTANT BATTLE BETWEEN FINANCIALLY STRAPPED LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND CROOKS

D~IPPING

WITH MONEY.

IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE
WEEKLY SHOOTING BUDGET FOR NBC'S MIAMI VICE IS MORE THAN 30%
HIGflER THAN THE ANNUAf, BUDGET FOR 'l'HE -RgAL VICE SQUAD IN THE
CITY OF t1IAMI.
ASSET FORFEITURE CAN HELP US REDRESS THE BALANCE.
NOTHING
CASH.

~HLL

OUT

DRY UP THE DRUG RINGS I,IKE GOING AI:'TER THEIR

AND EVERY DOLLAR THAT WE CAN SEIZE FROM THEIR PROFITS

t-1UST GO RIGHT INTO . Till:: NARCO FUND TO HET-'P US BREAK THE BACKS OF
~HEIR

ORGANIZATIONS.
EARLIER I SAID THAT THE KEY TO THIS PROBLEM WAS NOT

MORE LAWS BUT MORE ENFORCEMENT. · NEVERTHELESS, THERE ARE THREE
LAWS THAT WOULD ·aE · VERY HELPFUL IN FIGHTING THIS BATTLE.
I MENTIONED THE CHEt-HCAL EPHEDRINE A LITTLE WHILE
AGO.

IT IS THE KEY TO A NEW PROCESS FOR MANUFACTURING

ME'l'IIAMPHI-;TAMINC:, BU'r IT IS .NOT CURRENTLY ON THE LIST OF
CONTROLLED PRECURSOR CHEMICALS.
ADD EPHEDRINE TO THAT

I WILL SPONSOR LEGISLATION TO

LIST~

TlJR "DESIGNER DRUG" PROBLEM ALSO REQUIRES LEGISLATIVE
1\'l"rENTION.

NE\!1

VARH~TIES

0~'

SYNT .Hl~'riC
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DRUGS CAN BE CREATED

MUCH FASTfm '£HAN TllE LJ-;GISLATURE CAN • BAN THEM.

IN THE INTERIM,

LAW ENFORCEMENT IS HELPLESS TO PREVENT THEIR MANUFACTURE AND
SALJ-;.
THE ENTIRE FENTANYL FAMILY OF ARTIFICIAL HEROINS WAS
REC~NTLY

CONTROLLED THROUGH LEGISLATION SPONSORED BY MY

OFFICE.

THIS YEAR WE WILL SPONSOR A BILL TO AUTHORIZE THE

CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL TO PLACE A DRUG IN SCEHDULE I FOR
UP TO ONE YEAR ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS TO AVOID AN IMMINENT
DANGER TO TilE PUBLIC SAFETY.

THE TEMPORARY SCHEDULING COULD

ALSO BE EXTENDED FOR SIX MONTHS, THUS ALLOWING PLENTY OF TIME
FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION.
FINALLY, I WILL PROPOSE A REFINEMENT TO OUR ASSET
FORFEITURE LAWS.
1983 SESSlON

1

~'JE

UNDER THE EXPANDED POWERS I SPONSORED IN THE
CAN SEIZE FINANCIAL ASSETS 1 ·VEHICLES 1

AIRCRAFT, AND BOATS OBTAINED AS PROCEEDS FROM ILLEGAL' DRUG
TRAFFICKING.
NOW IT IS TIME TO ADD THE AUTHORIT! TO SEIZE OTHER
ASSETS SUCH AS REAL PROPERTY OWNED BY ILLICIT r1ANUFACTURERS AND
USED TO FACILITATE TllE PRODUCTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES.
IT'S HIGH ,TIME WE EXTENDED A LITTLE "POCKET BOOK JUSTICE" TO
THESE CRIMINALS.
THIS IS A COMPLEX PROBLEM.
TilE KEY POIN'l'S r'OR THE
UP:
ON~

COM~1IT'£EE

I HAVE TRIED TO TOUCH ON

THIS MORNING.

IF I MAY SUM IT

WE ARE FACING A DEADLY SERIOUS CLANDESTINe LAB PROBLEM,
TIIA'l' WF. KNOW IS ON THE VERGE OF GE'fTING MUCll WORSE.
FOR MANY REASONS, THIS PROBLEM MUST RE ADDRESSEIT AT

THE S'l'ATE LEVEL.

YE'l' OUR RESOURCES ON THAT LEVBL ARE l''AR 13ELOW

WIIA'l' O'l'HER S'l'A'l'F.S SPEND, AND 'l'O'l'ALLY INADEQUATE 'l'O DO
-1-1-

Til£~

JOB.

IT IS 'riME FOR A CON·CERTED J:;FFORT 'l'O ATTACK THIS .
PRODLEM AT EVERY STAGE OF THE PROCESS: FROM MONITORING
PRECURSOR CHEMICALS, TO BUSTING LADS, TO ANALYZING AND STORING
EVIDENCR, TO CLEANING UP AFTER THE RAIDS, TO EFFEC'riVE
PROSECUTlON AND, FINALLY, TO MAKING SURE TIIE PROFTS FROM THIS
DIRTY BUSINESS

NEVE~·

REACH THE POCKETS OF THE "COOKERS."

ALL OF THIS CAN.BE ACCOMPLISHED AT . A MODEST ~OS~.

THE

TRULY EXPENSIVE PROPOSITION IS TO DO NOTHING AND WATCH OUR
S'rATE 13E OV ERWHP.Lt1ED WI Til HOME-BRE\·lED DRUGS.
I WANT TO THANK TH.8 COMMI'rTEE FOR ITS INTEREST IN TIIIS
CRITICAL PRODLEM.

I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH YOU

AS \"m BRING OUR PROPOSAI.S I;IEFORE YOU l.'"'OR CONSIDERATION.
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Testimony Before The

SENArE SELECT COMMITTEE ON DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE

By

Stephen C. Helsley, Chief
Bureau of Forensic Services
Office of the Attorney General

November 5, 1985

Senator Seymour, thank you for inviting me to testify before your
committee.

My testimony will focus on ··the problems associated with

clandestine drug laboratories and
laboratories in California.

th~ir

impact on criminalist& and forensic

I would like to submit a copy for the record.

A major portion of my career was spent as a narcotic agent, and for five and
one-half years, I was Chief of the California Bureau of Narcotic
Enforcement.

The move from narcotic enforcement.to the Chief of the state

crime lab system has given me a number of unique insights.

Through it all I

have learned that California is a source for drug production and
prescription drug diversion.

The role that · California plays is very similar

to that of countries such as Cblumbia and Thailand.

California is

responsible for diversion of major amounts of prescription drugs, the
production of cannabis, and the production of controlled substances in
clandestine drug laboratories.

':fwo years ago, if I had been asked to characterize the clandesti'ne
laboratory problem, I would have done so much differently than I will
today.

It is my belief that the role of California C'.landestine drug

laboratories has grown from a relatively small part of the overall drug
problem in the 1960's to potentially the )argest in the near future.

In recent years, the federal government has

taken · stro~g

initiatives in

foreign 'drug producing countries and has made concerted efforts to interdict
smugglers before they reach the United States. Those who are familiar with

•
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World War II will remember the French line of defense which was known as the
Maginqt Line.

The Germans chose not to assault it directly but to race

around its edgeR.

I would submit to you that the. drug problem in this

country is no different.

i

While we have a strong line of defense to deal

with smugglers, they have circled around behind us and are now operating
effectively in California.

It is my view that our clandestine drug laboratory problem has two
principle elements--the first being traditional.

Within the traditional

category, I suggest that the following elements are present:

1.

the chemical precursors used to produce the drug are
supplied by domestic sources;

2.

reasonably simple techniques are involved in production;

3.

the drugs produced in these laboratories are most
frequently PCP, and methamphetamine;

4.

from a forensic standpoint, they are easily detected
either in solid dosage form or in bodily fluids;

5.

they are labor-intensive--both in the investigation and
analysis phases; and

6.

from an enforcement perspective, they can be impacted
significantly by strong regulatory control of the
constituent precursor chemicals.

.
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The second element of ·the clandestine drug laboratory problem is the
emerging type.

The first involves cocaine reprocessing.

This type of

laboratory is similar in many ways to traditional· clandestine labs in that
the product is easily analyzed and the forensic and enforcement
activities
·,
are labor-intensive.

It differs in that 1) there is little c.hance of impact

.

through regulatory control and 2) that the laboratory location has been
moved from a foreign country to California because of the effectiveness of
federal initiatives, and the profit margins can be higher because overhead
and middleman costs are cut.

The emerging problem of cocaine reprocessing

has the added dimension of requiring close coordination between federal
government intellige1fce sources and state and local authorities to deal with
the smuggling of the coca paste into California.

Such a laboratory was

seized in Lassen Oounty last year where over seven hundred pounds of cocaine
were being processed.

The second type of emerging laboratory that I see is one t.hat produces
synthetic drugs or intentionally produces . analogs of drugs.

This is the

newest problem t ·hat we have had to confront and is by far the most
threatening.

The analysis of drugs such as fentanyl requires the

utilization of methodologies and instrumentation in forensic laboratories
that, in most cases, exceed existing resources.

The very real potential

exists that with the explosion in information technology, instrumentation,
and chemical knowledge, drugs like fentanyl and its ilk could fill the
demand for drugs suc.h as heroin and c.ocaine which have in the past come to

-4-

us from forei .gn countries.

In the clandestine chemist's search for these

substitutes, mistakes will be made such as that experienced in Santa Clara
Cbunty where a substance known as MPTP was produced, consumed by drug
addicts, and resulted in their contracting Parkinson's disease.

I believe

i

the specifics of that situation will be presented later in the day.

The

synthetic and analog-producing clandestine laboratories thus present all of
the problems associated with traditional laboratories but with added demands
on user and environmental safety.

I would like to say a few words about what the law enforcement approach has
been to traditional laboratories.

In March 1984, the Attorney General's

COmmission on Narcotics Report was released which, in part, discussed
California's clandestine drug laboratory problem.

The COmmission

recommended that maximum impact could be achieved at the state level by
focusing the resources of the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement on those
aspects of the drug problem ·for which California was a source.

At the

direction of the Attorney General, the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement geared
up its efforts in those areas.
Against Marijuana Planting

A very large ·program known as the Campaign

(C~W)

has focused on the domestic cultivation of

cannabis in California and seized hundreds of millions of dollars worth of
the product before it could be put into the distribution network.

In the nrea of diversion of prescription drugs, the Bureau of

Nar~otic

Enforcement, together with the Drug Enforcement Administration recently

•
-5-

completed a massive investigation in the Los Angeles area that involved a
large

nu~ber

of physicians who were diverting prescription drugs and

facilitating their shipment to other states for sale.

In 1983-84 Fiscal Year, the Attorney General requested and obtained
additional special agents to' focus on t ·h e clandestine laboratory problem.
In that budget request, it was recognized that in most instances, the
primary source for domestic drug production in clandestine labs is not the
laboratory operator but the wholesale or

r~t~il

ch~mical

supplier who has

efther knowingly or unwittingly supplied the precursors.

California first

instituted laws to regulate the flow of these precursor chemicals in 1972.
Today there are more than two thousand retailers and wholesalers who can
supply the materials required in clandestine laboratories.

Five of the new

special agents were to work with the chemical supply industry to ensure
reporting compliance and an effective regulatory program.
the incredible

incr~ase

Unfortunately,

in the number of clandestine laboratories being

identified by state, federal, and

loc~l

authorities resulted in all of the

special agents being used to pursue criminal investigations.

The California

regulatory laws have been used as a model for other states, but
unfortunately few states have a precurs·o r control program.
resulted in ruany of California's

laborato~y

their materials from out of state.

This has

operators being able to obtain

In the future, a strong federal

leadership role is necessary to bring more control to the movement oj
precursor chemicals.
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The clandestine laboratory investigation is a very labor-intensive activity
with each case requiring about three months of special agent t ·ime.

The

forensic analysis by my staff requires approximately one-half month of
criminalist time per case.

There are currently about one thousand police

and sheriffs' detectives assigned to drug law enforcement in California from
I

the more than five hundred police agencies.

Few narcotic units have the

resource capabilities to do what is required in clandestine laboratory
investigations.

California's police and sheriffs' forensic labs are also

heavily strained by clandestine laboratory take-down and analysis.

It is the· emerging problem of synthetic and analog production on which I
would now like to focus my remarks.
enforcement

respo~ses

In this area, both the forensic and law

must be different from those employed with traditional

clandestine laboratories.

The forensic community must take the lead role.

The fentanyl problem and the analog problem associated with fentanyl are
giving us a glimpse of the future.

The analogs of fentanyl, both in solid

dosage form and in body fluids, requires the most sensitive of instrumentstion.

Most criminalistic laboratories' staff in the state are not trained .

or equipped to deal with this problem.

We are in the process of purchasing

the required instruments and training the staff 'in our San Rafael laboratory
to perform analysis on fentanyl.

The drug is very difficult to detect.

Traditional toxicological screening techniques are not sensitive enough.
Probationers, parolees, military personnel, and physicians in diversion
programs who must submit to urine screens will almost surely avoid

•
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detection.

Forensic pathologists and coroners cannot detect either

homicides or drug overdose resulting from fent'a nyl.

'Through voluntary

submission of body fluid and tissue samples to the University of California
at Davis laboratory, 104 deaths have been identified.

Each new · drug or analog of a drug will require the development of new
methodology and training requirements for

forensi<~

l<Lh•_,ra.t:ories.

If the

forensic scientist cannot analyze the drug in solid dose form, or identify
it in tissue, or if when a clandestine' lab is seized, does not. know how to

finish the production of the drug which may be at a midpoint in the chemical
process, then law enforcement will not be able to act correctly, nor will
prosecutors be able to bring charges.
are over one thousand drug analyses per
to contain controlled substances.

In our laboratory system alone, there
yea~

which appear to our staff not

But because fentanyl and other drugs are

present in millionths or billionths of a gram, they may pass through our
system undetected.

This state is served by two Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA) laboratories, nineteen police and sheriffs' department
laboratories, and the thirteen Bureau of Forensic Services labs.

Of those,

only the Drug Enforcement Administration has the ability to deal with the
full spectrum of fentanyl-like drugs.

The moHt serious problems which we in the forensic field must now confront
deal with the issues "safety" and "training".

The long term effects of

exposure to the chemic.als involved in c.landestine drug produ<'.tion are not
completeoly understood.

Much remains to be done in terms of coordination

;_8-

•

between law enforcement and criminalist& concerning the securing and
dismantling of the laboratorie-s themselves.

Unlike police officers who have

a wide variety of training courses and formalized training plans to chose
from, criminalists must rely on the FBI training laboratory in Quantico,
Virginia, for instruction.

Only a limited number of students can attend and

often the waiting period for a particular course can be many years.
Criminalists have no academy in California where they can be taught the
basic skills required; and there is certainly no place they can go to be
trained in the complexities of clandestine laboratories.

Complex problems

involving clandestine labo_ratories must be referred to the lfmi ted resources
of the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Those of us in the forensic field are worried about the future.
laboratories are a significant drain on our resources.

Clandestine

They present safety

risks and training problems that we are having extreme difficult in
addressing.

If we do not assume that the clandestine laboratory problem

will increase greatly, then we will not be prepared.

Some of our

predictions in the past have been none too accurate.

Who would have

predicted PCP abuse--most
drug of choice.

exp~rts

thought it was too toxic to ever become a

We didn't believe that codeine could be converted back into

heroin

an~.yet

in a clandestine laboratory in Stockton last year it was

done.

Who would have predicted that the Columbiana would bring their

cocaine to California to process?

&1d certainly no one among us would have

believed that California would export marijuana to Europe.

The drug

•
-9-

trafficker is driven by the desire for profit..
that drug dealers and producers
drugs in California.
firmly and quickly.

~an

The economic realities are

reap more of a profit by producing their

We must develop .a statewide strategy and act both
Additional resources are needed if we are to succeed.

·The . forensic community has always been in the "back seat" of ·drug law
enforcement efforts but future successes will depend on our ability to
a ·leadership role.
have.

~ake

Thank .you--1 will be happy to answer any questions you

TESTIMONY PRESENTED TO

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE

SENATOR JOHN SEYMOUR, CHAIRMAN

BY

ROBERT J. ROBERTON
Chief
Division of Drug Programs
Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs
State of California

November 5, 1985

THE NEW WAVE OF CLANDESTINE DRUG MANUFACTURING AND DISTRIBUTION IN CALIFORNIA
IS SYNTHETIC DRUGS.

THESE SYNTHETICS ARE DRUGS MANUFACTURED USING CHEMICALS

AND PROCESSES WHICH WILL PRODUCE THE VARIOUS EFFECTs· THAT ARE SALEABLE TO
STREET ADDICTS AND OTHER DRUG ABUSERS.
DRUGS SUCH AS HEROIN OR

MORPHI~E

THE SYNTHETIC DRUGS ARE CONTRASTED TO

THAT ARE PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF REFINING AND

CONCENTRATING WITH THE BEGINNING PRODUCT BEING A NATURAL PLANT OR FIBRE.

THE SYNTHETIC DRUGS HAVE SPECIAL APPEAL TO THE ILLICIT DRUG DISTRIBUTION AND
CLANDESTINE LABORATORY NETWORK.

IF A STREET DRUG CAN BE DEVELOPED IN A

KITCHEN OR GARAGE LABORATORY THE MANUFACTURERS CAN AVOID THE RISKS OF
IMPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION.

IN ADDITION, THE "CHEMIST CAN MAKE SUBTLE CHANGES

AND THEREBY MANUFACTURE A NEW SUBSTANCE WHICH IS NOT LISTED ON CALIFORNIA AND
FEDERAL SCHEDULES OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES; ACCORDINGLY, IT IS LEGAL 10
MANUFACTURE AND

SELL~

GENERALLY, THESE . SYNTHETICS. ARE EXTREMELY
POTENT AND
.

ONLY MINISCULE AMOUNTS IN THE PURE FORM NEED TO BE TRANSPORTED FROM ONE
DISTRIBUTION POINT Tq THE OTHER.

YOU CAN HOLD 200 GRAMS OF 3-METHYL FENTANYL

IN ONE HAND, THAT'S ABOUT 200 MILLION DOSES ON THE STREET.

A CHEMIST COULD PUT

ENOUGH IN THREE OR FOUR SHOE BOXES TO LAST THE HEROIN USING POPULATION, WHICH
IS HALF-A-MILLION PERSONS IN THIS COUNTRY, FOR.ABOUT FOUR YEARS.
MAKE A BATCH, SHUT POWN AND DISAPPEAR.
POSSIBLE.

THE CLANDESTINE

THEN BE DISASSEMBLED.

SO HE COULD

THAT'S JUST SPECULATION, BUT IT'S

LABORATORY CAN OPERATE FOR JUST A DAY OR SO AND

THIS LESSENS THE DETECTION RISK COMMON TO OTHER ILLiCIT

OPERATIONS WHERE THE LABORATORY MUST BE SET UP AND OPERATE CONTINUOUSLY.
FINALLY,- THE PROFIT POTENTIAL IS TRULY REMARKABLE.

A MERE $200 IN STARTING

CHEMICALS MAY BE TRANSFORMED INTO AS MUCH AS $2,000,000 IN STREET VALUE.

-2IN THE COURSE OF LEGITIMATE DEVELOPMENT A NEW DRUG WILL GO THROUGH SEVERAL
YEARS OF INTENSIVE LABORATORY TRIALS BEFORE IT'S EVER ADMINISTERED TO A HUMAN
SUBJECT.

THIS IS NOT SO WITH ILLICIT SYNTHETICS.

A RELATIVELY KNOWLEDGEABLE

CHEMIST CAN MANUFACTURE A COMPLETELY NEW COMPOUND AND IMMEDIATELY MARKET THEIR
PRODUCT FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION.

THE NEW COMPOUND WILL HAVE NO SCIENTIFIC TRIALS

AND ITS VERY FIRST USE WILL BE ON HUMAN SUBJECTS.

WITHOUT QUALITY CONTROLS THIS SLOPPY CHEMISTRY HAS ACCOUNTED FOR SOME DISABLING
AND CATASTROPHIC DAMAGE:

SOME ENTREPRENEUR, APPARENTLY TRYING TO COOK UP

SYNTHETIC DEMEROL MADE A MINOR MISTAKE AND ENDED UP PRODUCING MPPP ADULTERATED
WITH MPTP.

THIS CAUSED PARKINSON'S DISEASE SYMPTOMS IN DRUG ADDICTS.

THE TERM "DESIGNER DRUGS" WAS COINED BY DR. GARY HENDERSON AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA, DAVIS.

IN USING THE TERM HE REFERRED TO THE INCREASING

SOPHISTICATION OF ILLICIT CHEMISTS WHO SEEMINGLY PRODUCED DRUGS DESIGNED TO FIT
THE PREFERENCES OF INDIVIDUAL CLIENTS.

WANT A SHORT ACTING DRUG?. LONG

ACTING?

IT'S THERE FOR THE MAKING AND MIXING.

INTENSIVE HIGH?

OR WHATEVER?

THE MOST WELL KNOWN TRAGEDY ASSOCIATED WITH SYNTHETICS IS THE MPTP STORY.
REFER TO IT AS THE WALKING DEATH.

SOME

AS MENTIONED EARLIER, WHILE ATTEMPTING TO

HAKE MPPP, CHEMICAL ERRORS PRODUCED A COMPOUND CONTAINING THE NEUROTOXIN MPTP.
WE NOW KNOW THAT MPTP SELECTIVELY DESTROYS BRAIN CELLS IN THE SUBSTANTIA
NIGRA.

THIS CAUSES PARKINSON'S SYMPTOMS IN MANY CASES.

THESE SYMPTOMS MAY

SHOW UP A FEW MOMENTS AFTER INJECTION OR SEVERAL WEEKS, MONTHS OR YEARS LATER.
TO DATE, DR. WILLIAM LANGSTON

C~

fHE INSTITUTE FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH IN SAN JOSE

HAS CONTACTED 400 IV DRUG USERS REGARDiNG THEIR EXPOSURE TO MPTP.

-3APPROXIMATELY 270 ARE CONFIRMED TO HAVE USED MPTP AND ARE AT RISK OF DEVELOPING
PARKINSON'S LIKE SYMPTOMS.
COMPLETELY EVALUATED.

THE REMAINING 130 INDIVIDUALS HAVE NOT BEEN

NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THEY HAVE USED MPTP AND ARE AT

RISK.

THE FENTANYL FAMILY IS A CLASS OF VERY POTENT NARCOTIC _ANALGESICS ORIGINALLY
SYNTHESIZED BY THE JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY OF BELGIUM.

ALTHOUGH THE

CHEMICAL STRUCTURES OF THESE DRUGS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THE OPIATES; THE
FENTANYLS, POSSESS ALL THE PHARMACOLOGICAL. AND TOXICOLOGICAL ACTIONS OF THE
CLASSICAL NARCOTICS.

FENTANYL, THE PARENT DRUG IS USED EXTENSIVELY IN CLINICAL

. MEDICINE AS AN INTRAVENOUS ANALGESIC-ANESTHETIC UNDER THE TRADE NAME
"SUBLIMAZE"·.

IT IS A WELL RESPECTED DRUG.

BEGINNING IN 1979, ILLICITLY

SYNTHESIZED DERIVATIVES OF FENTANYL BEGAN APPEARING ON THE STREETS AS DRUGS OF
ABUSE UNDER THE NAME OF "CHINA WHITE"; THE NAME USUALLY ASSOCIATED WITH VERY
PURE SOUTHEAST ASIAN HEROIN.

SOON THEREAFTER, A SERIES OF DEATHS OCCURRED IN

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WHICH LOOKED LIKE TYPICAL HEROIN OVERDOSE DEATHS EXCEPT
THAT TOXICOLOGICAL ANALYSIS FAILED TO DETECT ANY NARCOTIC.

DR. HENDERSON

IDENTIFIED FENTANYL OR FENTANYL ANALOGS AS THE CAUSE OF DEATH.

TO DATE,· OVER

100 SUCH DEATHS HAVE OCCURRED IN CALIFORNIA. - THE LABORATORY AT U.C. DAVIS,
PARTIALLY SUPPORTED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF -ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROGRAMS, IS
USING VERY SENSITIVE ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES SPECIFIC FOR THE FENTANYLS AND HAS
DETECTED VARIOUS FENTANYL D.ERIVATIVES IN .BODY FLUIDS OF OVERDOSE VICTIMS.

IN

ADDITION, THEY HAVE DETECTED THE FENTANYLS IN THE URINE OF A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER
OF INDIVIDUALS ENROLLED IN VARIOUS METHADONE AND
OTHER DRUG
TREATMENT PROGRAMS
.
.
THROUGHOUT CALIFORNIA.

OF APPROXIMATELY 500

~RINE

SAMPLES RANDOMLY COLLECTED

-4FROM NORTHERN CALIFORNIA METHADONE PROGRAMS 10J WERE POSITIVE FOR FENTANYL
ANALOGS.

OF THE SAME 500 SAMPLES, ONLY 3.8J WERE POSITIVE FOR OPIATES, 7/10 OF

1J FOR AMPHETAMINES AND ONLY 2 PERCENT FOR ALL OTHER DRUGS COMBINED.

FROM THIS

DATA YOU CAN SEE THAT FENTANYL ANALOGS ARE BECOMING A MAJOR PROBLEM IN
CALIFORNIA.
CONFIRMED FENTANYL ANALOG OVERDOSE DEATHS COME FROM BOTH RURAL AND URBAN AREAS
OF CALIFORNIA.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY LEADS WITH 26.

SIXTEEN COUNTIES IN ALL HAVE

HAD CONFIRMED OVERDOSE DEATHS FROM FENTANYL ANALOGS INCLUDING SAN FRANCISCO,
KERN, FRESNO AND OTHERS.

TO DATE, THERE HAVE BEEN 10

~FFERENT

FENTANYL

ANALOGS IDENTIFIED IN SAMPLES BEING SOLD ILLICITLY UNDER A VARIETY OF NAMES
SUCH AS "CHINA WHITE" "SYNTHETIC HEROIN" AND "FENTANYL".

SOME OF THE FENTANYL

ANALOGS, FOR INSTANCE 3-METHYL FENTANYL, ARE THOUSANDS OF TIMES MORE POTENT
THAN MORPHINE.

3-METHYL FENTANYL IS BELIEVED TO BE ABOUT 3,000,000 TIMES MORE

POTENT THAN MORPHINE WHILE OTHERS MAY BE AS MUCH AS 6,000 TO 7,000 TIMES THAT
OF MORPHINE.

ON THE STREET MARKET FENTANYL IS TOTALLY INDISTINGUISHABLE IN ITS APPEARANCE
AND EFFECT FROM HEROIN.

THE FENTANYLS ARE CUT (DILUTED) WITH LARGE AMOUNTS OF

LACTOSE OR SUCROSE BEFORE THEY ARE SOLD SO THE AMOUNT OF ACTIVE DRUG PRESENT IS
EXCEEDINGLY SMALL.

THESE AMOUNTS ARE SO SMALL THEY CONTRIBUTE NOTHING TO THE

COLOR, ODOR OR TASTE OF THE SAMPLE.

'
THE INCREDIBLY HIGH
POTENCY OF SOME

FENTANYL ANALOGS MAKE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO MIX THE DRUG WITH CUTTlNG
AGENTS, CAREFUL MIXING BECOMES A SUPER CRITICAL PROCESS AND AN UNEVEN MIXTURE
HAY HAVE CAUSED SOME OF THE DEATHS ATTRIBUTED TO FENTANYL ANALOGS.

THE COLOR OF THE SAMPLES OBTAINED TO DATE, HAS RANGEry
"PERSIAN WHITE" TO LIGHT TAN SOLD AS "CHINA WHITE"
FENTANYL TO LIGHT BROWN SOLD AS "MEXICAN BROWN".

~ROM

PURE WHITE, SOLD AS

"SYNTHETI~

HEROIN" OR

THE BROWN COLOR COMES FROM

-5THE LACTOSE BEING SLIGHTLY CARMALIZED. THE TEXTURE

OF.SAMPLE~

OBSERVED IN A

LABORATORY HAS RANGED FROM VERY LIGHT AND FINELY POWDERED TO SOMEWHAT COURSE
CAKE LIKE AND CRUMBLY, SOMEWHAT

RESEMBLI~G

POWDERED MILK.

OCCASIONALLY, SAMPLES WILL HAVE A MEDICINAL OR CHEMICAL ODOR BUT THIS IS NOT
CHARACTERISTIC.

IN SUMMARY, THE FENTANYLS APPEAR IN ALL THE VARIOUS FORMS THAT HEROIN DOES AND
THERE IS NOTHING CHARACTERISTIC ABOUT ITS APPEARANCE THAT WILL IDENTIFY IT AS
FENTANYL OR DISTINGUISH IT FROM HEROIN OR OTHER NARCOTICS.

ROOTS OF ADMINISTRATION

INTRAVENOUS INJECTION IS THE MOST COMMON ROOT OF ADMINISTERING THE FENTANYLS;
HOWEVER, THEY MAY ALSO BE SMOKED, OR BECAUSE OF THE SOLUBILITY, ENHALED OR
SNORTED.

ABUSE POTENTIAL

FENTANYL AS A PHARMACEUTICAL AGENT WAS ALWAYS THOUGHT TO HAVE A LOW ABUSE
POTENTIAL BECAUSE OF ITS SHORT DURATION OF ACTION AND ITS RESTRICTED
AVAILABILITY.

ALSO, SUBLIMAZE IS AVAILABLE ONLY IN INJECTABLE AQUEOUS

FORMATIONS CONTAINING EITHER 100 OR 500 MICROGRAMS PER VILE.

THESE RELATIVELY

SMALL AMOUNTS AND LOW CONCENTRATIONS MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR A TOLERANT ADDICT TO
ADMINISTER A EUPHORIC DOSE CONVENIENTLY.

-6UNTIL RECENTLY, THE ONLY DOCUMENTED ILLICIT USE OF FENTANYL WAS IN DOPING RACE
HORSES.

NARCOTICS ARE FREQUENTLY USED TO DOPE HORSES BECAUSE THEY PRODUCE

EXCITATION IN THE HORSE, AND OTHER ANIMALS AS WELL SUCH AS THE CAT AND MOUSE.
FENTANYL'S SHORT DURATION OF ACTION AND ITS VERY LOW, DIFFICULT TO DETECT
CONCENTRATIONS IN BLOOD AND URINE MAKE IT AN IDEAL DOPING AGENT.

FENTANYL HAS

BEEN USED IN THIS MANNER FOR NEARLY A DECADE.

THE FENTANYLS ARE NOW AVAILABLE THROUGHOUT MOST OF CALIFORNIA, BECAUSE
THEY MAY BECOME THE DRUG OF CHOICE BY MANY HEROIN USERS, IT IS OUR OPINION
THAT FENTANYL USE WILL INCREASE IN CALIFORNIA.

ITS USE WILL SPREAD TO OTHER

STATES AND NEW DERIVATIVES WILL APPEAR PERIODICALLY.

ANALYSIS OF SAMPLES FOR FENTANYL ANALOGS

THE FENTANYLS ARE VERY DIFFICULT TO DETECT EITHER IN BODY FLUIDS OR
PARAPHERNALIA BECAUSE THE AMOUNTS PRESENT ARE SO SHALL AND BECAUSE THEY DO NOT
REACT WITH THE REAGENTS ROUTINELY USED IN THE ANALYSIS OF NARCOTICS OR OTHER
COMMON DRUGS.

IN FACT, THE U.C. DAVIS LABORATORY HEADED BY DR. GARY HENDERSON

IS THE ONLY LABORATORY IN THE U.S. WHICH CAN RELIABLY DETECT FENTANYL ANALOGs·
IN BIOLOGICAL SAMPLES.

DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROGRAMS INVOLVEMENT

DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROGRAMS (ADP) IS VERY ACTIVE IN STUDYING THE
SYNTHETIC DRUG PHENOMENON.

OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES ARE IMPROVED METHODS FOR

THE DETECTION OF SYNTHETIC DRUG USAGE AND ENHANCED PREVENTION THROUGH THE
DISSEMINATION OF UPDATED INFORMATION.

ADP CONTRACTS WITH THE UNIVERSITY OF

CALIFORNIA DAVIS CAMPUS TO PROVIDE TESTING SERVICES OF BIOLIGICAL SAMPLES AND

-7POWDER OR PARAPHERNALIA FOR FENTANYL AND THE VARIOUS FENTANYL ANALOGS.

IN

ADDITION, DR. HENDERSON WILL ASSIST IN DEVELOPING A ROUTINE PRODUCTION TYPE
TEST AND CONFIRMATION ANALYSIS METHODS FOR THE FENTANYL LIKE DRUGS.

WHEN YOU

CONSIDER THAT THE CONCENTRATION OF FENTANYLS IN BIOLOGICAL SAMPLES IS MEASURED
IN PARTS PER BILLION IT IS

EASY TO APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULTY IN DEVELOPING

ANALYTICAL METHODS WHICH CAN RELIABLY DETECT FENTANYL ANALOGS AT A PRICE WHICH
IS NOT PROHIBITIVE.

ADP PLANS TO DO MARKET EVALUATION IN AN EFFORT TO CONVINCE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
LABORATORIES THAT THERE WILL BE SUFFICIENT BUSINESS AVAILABLE TO JUSTIFY
DEVELOPING THE ASSAY NECESSARY FOR FENTANYL TESTING AT A REASONABLE PRICE.

THROUGH OUR CONTRACT WITH THE INSTITUTE FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH HEADED BY DR.
WILLIAM LANGSTON, ADP SUPPORTS A CONTINUING EFFORT IN DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE
OF MPTP ON THE STREET AND THE IDENTIFICATION, LOCATION FOLLOW-UP AND TREATMENT
OF PERSONS EXPOSED TO MPTP WHO ARE IN DANGER OF ACQUIRING MPTP INDUCED
PARKINSON'S DISEASE.

IN CLOSING, LET ME SHARE THESE THOUGHTS.

1.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COSTS MUST BE CONSIDERED AN IMPORTANT PART OF ALL
DISCUSSIONS REGARDING SYNTHETIC DRUGS.

ESPECIALLY BECAUSE OF THOSE DRUGS

WHICH CAN CAUSE NEURODEGENERATIVE DISEASES SUCH AS MPTP.

MANY OF THESE

PATIENTS REQUIRE FREQUENT HOSPITALIZATION INCLUDING INTENSIVE CARE BECAUSE
OF THE NEED TO STABILIZE THROUGH

THER~PEUTIC

DOSES OF MEDICATION.

-8-

SOME OF THEM, THE MORE SEVERELY AFFECTED, WILL REQUIRE LONG TERM AND
CONSTANT NURSING SUPERVISION.

A MOST COSTLY ENDEAVOR.

WE CANNOT ESCAPE

THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT WE HAVE BEFORE US A. PROBLEM OF SERIOUS MEDICAL
AND ECONOMIC MAGNITUDE.

SIGNIFICANT COSTS WILL OBVIOUSLY ARISE FROM NEEDED

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TREATMENT PROGRAMS AS THE PROBLEM'S SEVERITY
INTENSIFIES.

2.

THE TRAINING NEEDS FOR BOTH LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE TREATMENT NETWORK MUST
BE ADDRESSED IMMEDIATELY.

WITHOUT APPROPRIATE TRAINING THESE INSTITUTIONS

CANNOT MITIGATE THIS EMERGING PROBLEM.

3. LABORATORIES PLAY AN ESSENTIAL ROLE IN OUR ABILITY TO DETECT THE FENTANYL
ANALOGS IN BODY FLUIDS.

CURRENTLY, WE HAVE ONLY ONE LABORATORY IN

CALIFORNIA WITH THE EXPERTISE TO DO THIS.

UNDER THE GUIDANCE AND SUPERVISION OF DR. GARY HENDERSON AT THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS, WORK HAS CONTINUED FOR THE LAST FOUR YEARS TO
ESTABLISH A ROUTINE TEST FOR THE ANALOGS OF FENTANYL.
CAN TEST AT PARTS PER MILLION.

MOST LABORATORIES

WITH FENTANYL TESTING WE ARE TALKING ABOUT

PARTS PER BILLION IN BODY FLUIDS HENCE ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES.

THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA'S DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROGRAMS WILL CONTINUE TO
SUPPORT THIS WORK WHICH IS OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE.

I WOULD STATE EMPHATICALLY THAT THE USE OF FENTANYL ANALOGS IS ALREADY
SPREADING THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES.

UNTIL WE HAVE A NETWORK OF MORE

SOPHISTICATED LABORATORIES, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO TRACK OR UNDERSTAND THE
SCOPE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE DEVELOPING PROBLEM.

-94.

THE DOMESTIC PRODUCTION OF NEW, POTENT, SYNTHETIC DRUGS WILL BE THE MAJOR
DRUG ABUSE PROBLEM IN THE FUTURE.

AS EFFORTS TO CONTROL NATURAL PRODUCTS

SUCH AS OPIUM, COCA,- AND MARIJUANA BECOME MORE SUCCESSFUL, AND AS
SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT THE DIVERSION OF PHARMACEUTICALS BECOME MORE
EFFECTIVE, THERE WILL BE MORE INCENTIVE TO ILLICITLY SYNTHESIZE DRUGS
LOCALLY.

5.

NEW SYNTHETIC DRUGS WILL APPEAR WHICH WILL BE MORE POTENT AND MORE
SELECTIVE IN THEIR ACTION.

6.

SMOKING AND "SNORTING" THESE DRUGS (ROUTES OF ADMINISTRATION DIFFICULT TO
DETECT) WILL BECOME MORE POPULAR.

7.

THE USE OF THE NEW SYNTHETICS WILL SPREAD TO OTHER STATES AND COUNTRIES.

8.

THE LOW RISK OF DETECTION WILL STIMULATE THEIR USE IN POPULATIONS SUCH AS
PRISONERS, PAROLEES, AND MILITARY PERSONNEL.

9.

EASY TO SYNTHESIZE FROM COMMON ' INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS.

10.

PRODUCE. EFFECTS IDENTICAL TO HEROIN.

11.

EXTREMELY POTENT (1000'S OF TIMES HEROIN).

12.

NOT PETECTED BY ROUTINE CHEMICAL ANALYSIS.

13.

NOT CLASSIFIED AS RESTRICTED (ILLEGAL) DRUGS.

.~JO-

14.

LESS SOPHISTICATED LABORATORIES WILL ATTEMPT TO MAKE FENTANYL
DERIVATIVES, THUS INCREASING THE POSSIBILITY OF TOXIC BY-PRODUCTS.

15.

OTHER FAMILIES OF VERY POTENT HEROIN-LIKE DRUGS WILL BE SYNTHESIZED,
APPEAR ON THE STREETS, AND BE EQUALLY AS DIFFICULT TO DETECT.

16.

FAMILIES OF OTHER DRUGS OF ABUSE (COCAINE, THE HALLUCINOGENS) WILL BE
SYNTHESIZED AND APPEAR ON THE STREETS.

IN SHORT, IN THE FUTURE, DRUGS OF ABUSE WILL
BE SYNTHESIZED DOMESTICALLY FROM READILY
AVAILABLE CHEMICALS IN CLANDESTINE LABORATORIES

THE DANGERS OF THE PESIGNER DRUG PHENOMENON
PREPARED FOR PRESENTATION TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE
November 5, 1985
by
J. William La~gston, M.D.
Director, Parkinson's Research and Clinical Programs
The Institute for Medical Research
and ·
The Santa Clara Valle~ Medical Center
Senator Seymour and.colleagues, ladies and gentlemenThank you for inviting me to testify today on the important
issue of "designer drugs".
I believe I may have been the first
to testify on this issue at your original hearing, which was held
on October 22, 1984. It is gratifying to see that the level of
attention and interest by local, state and federal authorities
has gained momentum since that time. The problem coniinues to be
a potentially serious and explosive one, a fact that I'm sure you
are well aware of.
As there are many others here today who will
be discussing in some detail the principles and concepts behind
"designer drugs", and the potential reasons for their growth, I
would like to focus on the medical hazards as a physician and as
the one who has had perhaps the most experience with "designer
drugs" which cripple and maim.
This experience began for us in 1982. At that time, I had
neither heard of the concept of "designer drugs", nor was I aware
that such things were feasible.
In July of 1982, we began seeing
a series of young adults who had, literally overnight, become
frozen ·and··unable to move. This was a dramatic and frightening
medical presentation, and I had never seen anything like it
previously. Over a period of approximately three weeks, we
accumulated seven such cases •. These young people were unable to
speak, walk, or voluntarily move.
Some were severely troubled by
tremor. · Even more remarkable, their signs and symptoms resembled
those of severe Parkinson's disease, a syndrome that we usually
see only in aged individuals. As part of this testimony I will
be showing a videotape to illustrate the condition these patients
were in.
The discovery of these cases, and the fact that the onl1.
common link between them was the use of "synthetic" or "new'
heroin, set off an intensive investigation to track down the
offending agent. This effort eventually led us to the Lane
Medical Library at Stanford to search for a 1947 paper by Albert
Ziering and colleagues describing the synthesis of a synthetic
narcotic which belongs to the same family as Demerol, a
frequently used analgesic. For short, I will call this compound
MPPP. Much to our amazement, this article had been very
carefully razor-bladed out of the Stanford Medical Library as
were several other relevant articles. We now know that an
individual (who we have heard holds a law degree) had done a

careful literature search looking for a narcotic which was both
uncontrolled (i.e, legal to possess) and easy to synth~size.
HPPP met both of these criteria. We now know that this compound
was synthesized in a garage laboratory and sold on the streets of
northern California as "synthetic heroin". We further know that
this individual eventually made a bad batch of "synthetic heroin"
which contained almost pure MPTP, a by-product of synthesis of
MPPP. Either too much heat or acid produces this compound which
we now know to be one of the most potent neurotoxins ever
described. This compound crosses into the brain and selectively
destroys nerve cells in the brain which are responsible for
movement. These nerve cells are located in an area called the
substantia nigra and happen to be the very same cells which die
in Parkinson's disease. This latter effect explains why these
patients look so much as if they had Parkinson's disease. This
damage to the nervous system is permanent and many of these young
people are in a rather precarious and critical condition in terms
of management of their medical care. Further, we have now
identified over 400 individuals who may have been exposed to this
compound, raising the spectre of an epidemic of Parkinson's
disease in the future. We now spend a fair amount of time just
trying to regulate medications of the more severely affected
people and in attempting to locate and follow those who we think
are at risk.
We believe this represents the first "designer drug
disaster", something which one might have predicted could occur
based on the principles involved.
I believe there are three
major medical hazards to the "designer drug" approach, a
phenomenon which we fear may spread for reasons that I'm sure you
will be hearing repeatedly today. The first hazard relates to
the synthesis of a new compound which is destined for human use.
Anytime a legitimate drug company makes a new compound they are
required to carry out studies on it in animals for years before
taking it to humans. In the case of designer drugs, the process
is almost instantaneous, in that after a new compound is
synthesized the first animals to be subjected to its effects are.
human. In other words, addicts are in essence being treated as
human guinea pigs. If these "illicit chemists" and the addicts
are fortunate, the new compound will be safe, and non-toxic.
However, there is no way of predicting when one of these new
analogues will turn out to be a poison. Secondly, these
laboratories never have quality controls. A legitimate
pharmaceutical company, of course, has to carefully monitor the
quality of the products they make. On the other hand these
"kitchen chemists" rarely, if ever, have the analytic equipment
available to see if their compounds are pure. This is, in fact,
what happened with MPTP. The third major problem is the potency
of the new "designer drugs", something I'm sure you will hear
more in detail about from Dr. Henderson.
I'm gratified to see these hearings being held because the
time to act is now. Although the first "designer drug disaster"
has indeed occurred, one can hope by taking a multi-faceted
approach, further such problems might be avoided.
In regard to what steps might be taken to combat this

potentially serious social and public health problem, I would
offer the following suggestions:
1. The drafting of new legislation to try to remove the
incentive of being able to make "legal" narcotic substitutes
has already occurred in the state of California. I would
urge that an on-going effort be initiated to assess the
effect of this legislation, so that ways to modify and
improve upon what has already been done can take place on an
ongoing basis.
2~ If future medical hazards are to be addressed, a carefu~
monitoring program must be carried out. We have attempted aq
active intervention program using an "anonymous sample"
program, combined with considerable publicity to notify .
addicts that they could get the drugs they're using tested.
While we have collected over 80 samples through this program,
I feel that by and large it has proved an inefficient and
inadequate way to find out what is being sold on the streets.
The only avenue I know at present is to develop and support
an intensive monitoring program to assess the content of
samples of drugs.
Such samples could come from a combination
of tho~e garnered in arrests and drug raids, as well as
street buys. An active and on-going "street buy" program,
I'm beginning to believe, is the only way to accurately
monitor what new compounds are being made and sold as street
drugs.

Such a monitoring program should represent a statewide
network, such that new drugs can be quickly identified and
word transmitted throughout the state. This will require a
central and sophisticated laboratory, capable of identifying
new compounds as well as those already discovered.
3. Biological testing for new compounds.
This laboratory
should have the capability to carry out biological testing of
new compounds to test for toxicity. Those which are toxic
could quickly be identified and appropriate.warnings could be
posted.
If another MPTP-like disaster could be a~oided, the
financial savings could be enormous. We estimate one patient
alone, requiring full time nursing care, could cost the'state
between $20,000 and $30,000 per year.
4. The development of · screening procedures for well defined
designer drugs.
Once compounds were identified and clearly
established t6 be constantly produced for street consumption,
a third responsibility of this laboratory might be to develop
screening procedures so local authorities could easily check
for either the compounds or their metabolites in samples and
biological fluids.
5. The development of a consultation team that could respond
immediately when new designer drug disasters are identified.
Such a team might be comprized of a representative from a
toxicology laboratory, an internist, a neurologist acquainted
with the nervous system effects of these drugs, and perhaps
someone at the State level to coordinate this effort. Such a

team could quickly respond and evaluate new designer drug
problems.
6. Establishing a study of the "drug designer disaster"
which has already occurred. We are, in essence, in the
position of dealing with the many young addicts who were
affected or potentially affected by MPTP. We strongly
believe a comprehensive study of precisely how this
"epidemic" occurred, and both the short term and long term
consequences of such a potential health hazard, would be very
valuable in learning to deal with future such episodes. We
desperately need funding assistance to care for those
patients already severely damaged as well as to identify and
follow those who maybe at risk. The epidemiological benefit
of initiating such a study is that it could allow us to
develop techniques for studying future such problems. One
good example of this is the drug intervention program. This
came out of the study of M~TP Parkinson patients and, I
think, it has taught us that an active intervention program
with anonymous sampling may be only moderately effective.
This could save time and effort in the future.
The foregoing represent only a preliminary set of
suggestions which I hope this committee will find of some
value in responding to the designer drug problem. Agai~, I
would emphasize that a central laboratory that could monitor
all of these problems and establish a communications network
with local and state authorities is c·entral to identifying
and dealing with this problem, as well as monitoring and
assessing the effectiveness of various forms of legislation
which ar~ in place or being planned to deal with this
problem.
Again, thank you for the opportunity of testifing for this
committee.
Respectfully submitted,

J. William Langston, MD

DESIGNER DRUGS: THE NEW SYNTHETIC DRUGS OF ABUSE
GARY L. HENDERSON, PH.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Environmental Toxicology, School
Medicine, University of California, Davis, California 95616
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INTRODUCTION
Just a decade ago drugs of abuse came from two sources: plants, like the coca
bush and the opium poppy, and diverted pharma~euticals- . Today, new totally
synthetic drugs produced by clandestine laboratories are becoming an increasingly
important source of abused substances. These illicit laboratories are developing
n·ew chemical entities from c;ommonly available industrial chemicals, and are
distributing drugs which are both selective in pharmacological activity and very
potent. Because of legal technicalities, these newly synthesized drugs may
actually be immune from national and international regulations controlling abused
substances.
This· presentation wi 11 report on the rise of such clandestine 1aboratori es in
the United States which have synthesized and distributed synthetic substitutes
for heroin; substitutes which have caused a number of overdose deaths.
M~THODS

During the past four
urine, tissue and powder
abuse. These samp 1es were
agencies and drug treatment

years our laboratory has analyzed over 2000 blood,
samples for the presence of new synthetic drugs of
obtai ned from coroner's 1aboratori es, 1aw i nforcement
programs.

RESULTS
· A total of 102 overdose deaths have been identified in which new synthetic
narcotics were found in the body fluids. In all cases, these samples were
thoroughly analyzed by forensic laboratories which were unable to identify any
known narcotic or other drug of abuse. Of these 102 deaths, 99 occurred in the
state of California, while the remaining 3 cases occurred in the -neighboring
states of Arizona and Oregon. Most deaths occurred in Northern California and are
thought to be due to 3-methyl fentanyl, a new derivative introduced on the
streets during 1984.

FENTANYL ANALOGS
At least seven different compounds were identified:
these include the
narcotic analgesic fentanyl (Sublimaze8 ) and five simple analogs:
alphamethylfentanyl, benzylfentanyl, para-fl uorofentanyl, 3-methylfentanyl, acetyl
alpha-methylfentanyl, and an acryl analog of alpha-methylfentanyl.

EPIDEMIOLOGY OF THE FENTANYL USER
Data from i nvesti gati ve reports associ ated with the fentanyl overdose cases
have been compiled and the "typical" fentanyl user appears to be a 31 year-old
white male living in one of the suburban areas surrounding · San Francisco, Los

-2Angeles, or San Diego. The deceased usually have a history of heroin addiction
but in many cases the individuals appear to have been drug free for some time lnd
only recently returned to drug use.

FENTANYL USE IN DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAMS
A total of 519 urine samples from persons enrolled in drug treatment programs
were analyzed and fentanyl was found in 10% of the samples (range 0%-24%). This
is equal to or greater than the incidence of heroin, amphetamine or cocaine use
in these programs.

FENTANYl USE IN CORRECTIONAl FACILITIES
A total of 139 urine samples from m1mmum security correctional facilities
were analyzed and fentanyl was found in 2% of the samples (range 0%-4%). These
data suggest that the fentanyls are not in use in correctional facilities at this
time.

COMMENTS
Our findings indicate that clandestine laboratories are now systematically
di stri buti ng new, very potent, synthetic drugs of abuse throughout the State of
California. The distribution of overdose deaths and the personal profile of the
victims suggest that these drugs are not being distributed within any localized
geographical area or to any particular ethnic or age group, but instead seen to
be distributed rather uniformily throughout ·the addict population. Most
surprising has been the occurrence of these drugs in suburban, even rural areas.
Further, our most recent observations suggest the distribution of the drugs is
spreading to other areas of the country.
It is this author • s opinion that in the future, the domestic production of
new, potent, synthetic drugs will be the major problem we will face in the area
of drug abuse. As efforts to control the production and distribution of natural
products such as opium, coca, and marijuana become more successful, and as
safeguards aimed at preventing the diversion of pharmaceuticals become more
effective, there will be more incentive to illicitly synthesize drugs locally.
The challenge of these new synthetic drugs of abuse is enormous. Little is
known abo~:~t their pharmacology and toxicology. At best, only brief reports of the
activity of some of these compounds are available and generally limited to their
effects in laboratory animals.
All the analogs we have identified to date are quite potent. In fact,
3-methylfentanyl is 5000 times as potent as morphine. These very potent drugs
carry a high risk of accident a 1 overdose, but a 1ow risk of being detected by
conventional analytical methods.
Analogs of the fentanyl series are relatively easy to synthesize from
inexpensive industrial chemicals and only small amounts need to be made since
they are so potent.
Finally, because these compounds are new chemical entities, they will not
appear on any national or international list of restricted substance. At the time
of this writing, four of the seven compounds identified in our study are
restricted.
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Our traditional responses to drug abuse problems offer little promise of
success.
Creative chemists have exploited the pharmaceutical chemistry literature to
develop these new drugs; however, restricting access to this information is not
feasible. The literature of the last 50 years of pharmacological research is
easily access.ab le throughout the world and already contains synthetic routes to
hundreds, even thousands, of potent narcotics, stimulants, hallucinogens, and
sed at i ve-hypnot i c dr·ugs.
Controlling the chemicals needed to make these drugs is also not likely to be
an effective solution. In the past, this only stimulated clandestine chemists to
assembl~ the drugs from more elementary precursors which are common chem.i cal s of
commerce.
Even locating and closing these laboratories has proven to be an extremely
difficult task. These laboratories need operate for only a short time to make a
few· hundred grams of very potent material. Also, there ·may be no legal
justi fi cation to interfere wHh ·a laboratory that i-s synthesizing new, . as ·yet,
unrestricted chemicals.
·
Simple answers to this problem are not·readily apparent; however,· we are not
likely to find th~ .unless the problem is . first recognized. Educators an~
researchers should be made aware that the great advances in the pharmaceutical
science which have yielded so many potent, life-saving medications are now
providing a growing array of life-threat~ni~g drugs of abuse.
·
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Mr. Ghairman and fellow members of the c.ommittee.
for giving me the opportunity to speak before you

I would like to thank you
tod~y.

The issue of

clandestine laboratories is one that effects us all in one way or another.

Two months ago in Sac.ramento, a man was sentenced to prison for the
c.landestine manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine (SPEED).

Over a period of five years he had moved his secret labora~ory operation
from plac-e to plac£' in Northern Californil'l.

He seemed to

h~ve

a sense of

knowing when his operation was about to be seized.

Narcotics agent::; pursued him from rented homes by the sea, to mobile homes
on seduded mountain property.

Eac.h time the agents moved in they found

notlting more th<m the lingering odors and/or chemical waste where the lab
had been hidden.

\-ll10n he was finally arrested, agents found portions of his laboratory
secreted in a make-shift trcehouse on several acres of land.

During this investigation anrl thrfJugh

lenf~thy

interviews following the

arrf:'st, a great deal w<w learned abm.tt the secret opc..'ration.

It was learned for instance how the necessary chemjcnls were transported
fJ·om c.lwmic.al c.ompanies in Cal ifornin, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington in
rented trucks, to

r~nted

storage lockers.

These lockers would

proximity to thf• st.•cret laboratory locations.
ut!liz£'d as

11

storf's 11 to h.! tnppc•d

usiur, prccautinnm·y

llll'l\fHIJ"l'H

fn•qu('nci,•a, nnd in some

RS

nl•ecled.

b~

in close

The loc.kers would then be
This was all

~tccomplished

sud1 as radio ac.annen; to monitor polic-e

1natanc~s

surveillance c.ameras.

During this t !me period, this man produced up to 15-20 pounds of high grade

..

methamphetamine per week.

The finished speed was then distributed to major

dealers in Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, and Sacramento counties.

He was proud of his business.

His profits were immense.

He drove Maserati

and Porsche sports c.ars, lived in an expensive home in an affluent
neighborhood in the Bay Area, invested in stocks, and paid cash for
property.

Life was good.

Until he was arrested and sent to prison.

During a recent jnterview he told us somPthtng that I want to share with
you.
been

He said that when he was sent to pr.lson this time (he had previously
ln~arc ~ rated

for kidnapping for ransom, and found drug manufacturing to

be more profitable) thnt he was optimistic about his reception inside
prison.

He was sure of one thinn, that he would be revered for his ac.C.omplishments
as the "c.hem:f.st" of a large scale drug producing operation.

He said that he

truly felt that he was going to he a member of an elite group of brotherhood
of. criminals.

Murh to his surprise he told us that pri6on is now full of enterprising
clandeHtine drug chE•mists.
knowledgc~ahle

th.la

th ·~

1he only distinction is that r.ne might be more

•:>ther.

This example clearly represPntA the extent of the
California today.
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probl~m

we are facing in

Formulas for the manufacture of drugs such
around in our penal

a~

speed and PCP are passed

institutions~

Street chemists lac.king in technical knowlege have no idea and, more often
than not, do not care about the contamination that occurs to, 1) people
using the drugs they produce that often contain poisonous impurities, 2) the
natural

~esources

when chemical dumping occurs.

They also lack the

knowledge of . the dangers of explosion and fire from bad chemical reactions
and/or improper safety precautions.

There

ar~

clandentine laboratories that are seized as a result of explosion

and fire.

Firemen who are responding to these fires, are often una\.;rare of

tl1e dangerous chemicals inside.
with

wat~r.

Some of these chemicals are highly reactant

The result is explosions,

destructio~

of property, and

contamination to the atmosphere.

I want us all to remember for just a moment a couple of mbnths ago when we
observed an entire city block burn to

th~

ground in Philadelphia.

The cause

of thnt fire has heen adequately c"overed but if I may point out that a · small
quantity of explosives were dropped on an apartment.
the apartment was a qunntity of gasol.i ne.

It

Stored on the top of

The results were

d~vastating.

is by no m£'ans out of the realm of possibility that one of these

c.lnndcstine laboratories, sec.reted within an apartment complex, stockerl full
of volatile chemicals, conll l'l!Sillt in the same situation.

I want to emphasize that while
dcnigned for

saf~ty,

l.~gitimate

claodestin~

industrial

laboratori~s

are

laboratories are designed for secrecy.
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There is no quality control assuring that strict EPA and FDA rules are
followed insuring that our natural resources are not contaminated.

I would like to give you some examples of clandestine laboratories and the
way we find

th~m.

In doing so I would like to utilize some of the visual

aids here today:
methamphetamine lab in cul-de-snc
bathtub speed lab
bathtub speed lab exploded
PCP lab site in desert area (contamination)

exploded labs (dangers).point out in particular the apartment explision.

These r.landestine labs utilize some of the most toxic substanc.es known to
man during the prodttction of drugs.

ThP hi-products of

thes~

reactions are

toxic as well.

I think everyone in t;lti s room
experienced over the

rem~?mbP.rs

water~Plons

carcinogenic pesticides.

the rec.ent

stat(~wide

scare we

that had been contaminated with

Several people became ill after eating the

watermelons and the melons were subsequently removed from the stores.

In the production of some of the drugs in clandestine laboratories in
California,
pestir.ic!E.>s.
that

w~.

tl•e~re

are chemicals that are used in the production of

Those chemir.nls are c.arr.inogenic as well.

In many of the labs

seize, we find chemicals such as these dumped in our natural

resources.

Then• are. nlso rhemic.nls used in the cLtndesti.H.' manufacture of speed and
1-'Q, that contain quantities of <'yunide.
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If the r.yanide · dt('mic-als are

acdc.lentally mixed with adds, a deadly poisonous

ga~

is rE'leaaed.

There

are dor.umentc:•d a<".count s of cyanide deaths during the product ion of
clandestine drugs.

Evt•ryclay we read about the c.oncerns regarding toxic dumping in our
newspapers.

import~nt

It Js

to make note that out of the hundreds of clandestine

laboratories that we have seized, wE' have. yet to

se~

one single case where

tl1e responsible party has disposed of the <'hemtcals . properly.

In this state, everyday, there are seventl hundn•d labs being operated.

The

gallons q'f C'h('mic-.al wast c. produced froT!l these · operations art" being dumped
lnto:
s0~er

1)

Toilets where they end up in our

2)

our J.ukes and streams, contandnating the natural resources,

3)

alon~side

Today,

.d•J(_"

systems,

our roadwayn.

to the. lack ?f funds . and knowledge, there are. still law

(mforccment offleers who are exposed to these toxic substances.
wh~n

dismantling these laboratories, and

transportin~

This occurs

the hazardous

substances in police vehicles.

We do not hove the answers to the long tcrm

eff~cts

of toxic exposure.

We do not have the ansWt:'rs to the long term effects of dumping toxic waste
into the land.
Huffnr

r,~neti<-

J>o~s

1t

c-.ontaminaLP the

~~roundwatrr?

Will we ns a nation

side. af !eetfl to past> on Lo future gen e rations?

The whole

pirt'ure. of tllifl grO\Jing <'.::tn<'.er in our stntc ifi in<".rndihly c-omplex.
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I have attempted to

outlin~:>

some of the aspC'<·.ts of the

probl~m,

in terms of

what a clandestine lahonttory consists of, and the dangers inherent to
them.

WhC'n 1 bE>p,an tay pres(•nl Ht' ion I
cland\~stine

spok(~

of a man

n~cent ly

inr.arceratcd for

manufacturing and distributing meth<1mphetamine. in CaliforniH.

The investigation of that singular op<.>ration lHstcd for three years, from

the time it begnn until the end of the. court proceedings.
that investigation, sev('l'Hl others were initiated.

A<> a result of

Some- of "-'hich continue

as I speak.

Altl.ough it seems tllifl pr·oblC'm is insurmountable, I

an old C.hitwse proverb.
with a single nt'P.p.

wo ~ tld

like to quote from

l t says that E>ven a thousand mile journey begins

I l1ouestly believe that this hearing :f s the first rtep

in n•cognizinr, LIIC' r.lnndestint? lahoral'ory problem in C!ilifotnia, and the
r;1n.:t

important o1w.

1'11/'.'~r

YOU.
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The problem of clandestine laboratories · has grown dramatically
over_ the past five years, both locally and nationally.
In 1980,
the
Drug
Enforcement
Adminis.t ration,
Dangerous
Drugs
Activity
Report,
81-1,
documented
the
seizure
of
234
clandestine
labor~tories
nationwide.
Of
these
laboratories
seized
nationwide, 146 were related to amphetamines and 49 were related
to
phen_c yclidine
(PCP).
In
1984, _ the - Drug
Enforcement
Adminis tra t .ion report on Clandestine Laboratory Seizures in the
u.s. ,
198 4,
the
seizure
of
312
clandestine
documented
laboratories. Of these laboratories seized nationwidei 225 were
related to amphetamines and
30 were related to phencyclidine
·( PCP).
This · represents a 33 percent fncrease in clandestine
laboratories -during the past five ~ years.
The Western_ States Information Net-work
(WSIN)
1984 report on
Clandestine Laboratories . documents ~he . seizure . of _100 clandestine
·laboratories in the State of California.
Of the laboratories
seized in
California,
81
were
related to methamphetamine or
amphetamines,
14 were phencyclidine
(PCP)
laboratories,
and
5
-were other types of clandestine laboratories.
The
clandestine laboratories seized in California during
1984
accounted for approximately 33 percent of all laboratories seized
in the United States·.
Unfortunately, California has no peer as a
source "for cland~tinely manufactured· drugs.
I

!

'

During Fiscal Years 1983 and 1984, - the San Fran-cisco Division of
the Drug Enforcement Administratiof1, which is responsible for the
northern - · half of the State of Ciillifornia, nor_m ally working in conjunction . with ~tate ·and local authorities, were responsible
for
seizing
more
clandestine
laboratories
than
any
other
enforcement division of the Drug Enforcement Administration in
the United States.

The foregoing statistical
what is to follow.

data

is

offered

as

a

foundation

for

The area of clandestine laboratory investigation is an area of
investigation · that is little understood even in the narcotics
enforcement community.
The average DEA agent in a 20 year career
will
work
an
average
of
five
clandestine
laboratory
~nvestigations.
The average agent will be a case agent on one
case.
Officers and agents who work clandestine laboratories view these
investigations differently
from any other
form
of
narcotics
related investigation.
This is not only because of the large
amounts
of
evidence
(usually
seized),
but
because
of
the
technical complexity of the investigations and related hazards.
Approximately four percent of all clandestine laboratory raids
result in hospitalization of at least one federal investigator.
This is by far the largest single source of on-the-job injury
incurred by federal narcotics officers.
laboratory
associated
The
hazards
with
clandestine
investigations,
are also different from other law enforcement
investigations,
and
these hazards in order of priority are
(1) explosions; (2) fire; (3) weapons, and (4) short and long
term exposure to chemicals. On a national average, one of five,
or 20 percent of all clandestine laboratories result in, and/or
are discovered through, fires and/or explosions.
/

:

During the past several years, the Sacramento Resident Office of
the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Sacramento Office of
the State of California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement have been
working together in an informal task force operation.
This task
force
group
has
responded
to
approximately
70
clandestine
laboratories.
In 10 percent of the cases, agents and .officers
were confronted by suspects who had fully automatic and silenced
- 2 -

.
;

weapons.
In 10 percent of the cases, agents ·a nd
In
some form of booby traps or explos~ve devices.
the -· cases,
defendants
were
using
some
form
countermeasures·.
The
electronic
countermeasures
scanners
to
sophisticated · .video
monitors
and
devices.

officers found
30 percent of
of electronio
ranged
from
sound
sensing

The single, m9st significant, hazard encountered by agents and
officers has been exposure to hazardous chemicals and chemical
wastes.
·During . the course of 70 clandestine laboratory raids,
13 firemen and 4 police officers . required medical · treatment as a
result of exposure to hazardous chemicals and chemical wastes.
The casualty rate is 24 percent. · Because of exposure to caustic,
corrosive,carcinogenic,
cumulative,
irritating
explosive
and
flammable substances encountered at · lab sites ., every agent or
officer of ·the task force has suffered· minor injuries. These
injuries have included ·burns, rashes, headaches, lightheadedness,
and
nausea.
This
casualty
rate . of
100 percent is totally
unacceptable.
In speaking to other officers and agents across
the country, their injury
and ., casualty figures are comparable
with our own figures.
Little :. is known . about . the long term e'f fects of expqsure to toxic
and/or cumulative chemical substances.
Of concern to narcotics
officers is · the cumulative effect of chemical substances that are
being absorbed into our systems.
The chemicals in some instances
can be absorbed simply by being exposed to the chemicals in the
atmosphere. / , Other cheJ~~icals of a fat soluble nature can be
absorbed through the skin.
Of particular concern to officers is
exposure to .PCP,
its
precursors
or
analogues.
PCP,
its
precursors and analogues, have contaminated a nUmber of agents
and officers. · The drug is · cumulative · in . nature and has an
unknown active life.
It is also documented that .female officers
who. have been exposed to PCP in the past, have, at a later date,
passed PCP on to their unborn children.
Other officers have
reported
symptoms
of
drunkenness,
hyperactiveness,

·.
lightheadedness;
headaches,
skin rashes,
elevated heart
rate,
confusion,
short
term
memory
loss,
aggressiveness
and
hallucinations after exposure to PCP during laboratory raids.
Studies have verified the presence of PCP in blood and urine
samples of people who live near PCP laboratories and of narcotics
officers who enter the laboratories.
create
drugs
that
Two
other
clandestinely
manufactured
significant health and safety problems are the fentnyal compounds
and demerol analogues, HPPP, and MPTP.
In the case of the
fentanyls, minute amounts, as small as a grain of salt, can cat:.s6
death.
These compounds can be absorbed through the skin or
mucous
membranes.
HPTP/HPPP
laboratories
also
represent
a
serious threat and environmental hazard to both the public and
narcotics officers since HPTP has
been
directly
linked
to
Parkinson's Disease.
Clandestine laboratories create a myriad of problems for which we
have been unable to obtain acceptable answers.
Host of the
clandestine laboratories are found in rental properties.
After
officers are finished dismantling the laboratory and disposing of
the chemicals and waste products, there is always the question of
what to do with the rental property that, in most instances, is
contaminated with chemical spills and permeated by hazardous
chemicals.
There are also questions about what should be done
about -chemical spills on sides of county roads, where they were
dumped by suspects.
What about the chemicals and hazardous
wastes that are being dumped on agricultural lands and in our
rivers and streams?
Will these chemicals appear in the food
chain?
What effect will these chemicals have on water supplies?
In rural areas, where septage systems are utilized,- what effect
will chemical wastes have on retarding the decomposition of
effluent that leeches from these systems?
What is the threat to
the public?
What is the threat to future occupants?
Where and
•
with who does the liability lie?

- .4 -

.,

•.

We are no longer talking about isolated incidents.
Last year in
a 26 county area of Northeastern California, we participated in
the seizure. of 34 clandestine laboratories.
If you believe that
we are successful in apprehending iO percent of the clandestine
laboratories, that would mean that there were 340 operational
If 100 laboratories
clandestine laboratories in . the same area.
in
the
State
of
California ·last
year,
1,000
were
seized
laboratories
were
operational ~
Each _laboratory
is
creating
significant
health
and
environmental
hazards.
The · toxic
and
~oisonous waete~ proauced by these iaboratories are not measured
~.: grc:~. en\.. o~c-=-~ . ·.:we- in t~~1z and t.:mdreds of pounds.
The problems associated .with clandestine laboratories are not
only the problem of law enforcement.
Clandestine laboratories
are
a
problem
for
public
health
agencies,
environmental
protection
agencies,
educational
~nstitutions,
fire
protection
agencies, and other social services.
·The costs associated with
the destruction of clandestine laboratories and their wastes are
staggering.
At the present . time the average cost of disposal of
hazardous chemicals per laboratory is $3,000.
The problem of clandestine laboratories is a phenomenon of our
. .
generation, but as in the case of PCP contamination, the problem
will be passed on to future ·. generations.
The costs for medical
and health care for . con tami na.t e~ victims, projected into future
generations, are enormous.
What can be done with the problem of clandestine laboratories and the health
and safety issues that they raise for all branches of our local, state and
federal government? We do not have many answers, but we do have · some
recODillendations.
In the area of education:
Public safety personnel, police, courts,
corrections, and the public must ~iately be made aware of ·the health and
safety problems associated with clandestine laboratories.·
...

- 5 -
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Environmental protection and public health services must become
Research must
involved with the clandestine laboratory problem.
be done on the effects of exposure to hazardous substances
encountered in clandestine laboratories, so that law enforcement
laboratory test
personnel in the future do not have to serve as
animals.
Defendants who knowingly and intentionally violate the law endang.er the public
and pollute the environment should be held accountable for their actions, and
they should be made to pay for decontamination of the areas they have made
unsafe.
There should be greater parity between state and federal law with
enhanced penalties and fines for illicit laboratory operators.
Penalties
for
recidivism should be doubled with no options
allowed.
Chemical companies who distribute chemicals that are used in the
manufacture of clandestinely manufactured drugs should require
full identification for all cash sales; ana additional chemicals
should be scheduled.
There is a need
growing problem.

for

additional

trained

manpower

to

combat

this

There is also a need for safety equipment so that agents and officers don't
continue to contaminate themselves, their families, and their own
agencies.
As public servants we have all taken oaths to, in one way or another, protect
and serve the public. We will not have fully carried out our oaths until we
have found solutions for the problems raised here today.
I wish to commend this Committee for holding this
taking the first and hardest step in attempting to
problems associated with clandestine laboratories.

- 6 -
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•
My name is Tom Abercrombie a:nd. rm a CriminaUs.t w.i.th ·the Office of the Attorney
General, Bureau of Forensic Ser-v ices, JU. verside Cr.imi nalistics Laboratory.
been employed as a Criminalist at that site sjnce :the middle o~ 1979.
immediate job is four-fold.
and

methodo~ogies

I'v~

My

The first aspec.t ·.o:f :1-t :is to use scientific means

in order to analyzed physical evidence submitted to me by law

enforcement agencies.

Se.coodly, I issue repor.ts on my

find~ngs,

and also

testify in court, if needed, on exactly· what ~y ·report and/or analysis means
within the framework of the charges in quest_ip_o..
least important of my duties is to

a~sist

law

.Last.ly, but certainly not the

~nforceme.nt

agencies in field

investigations. · Specifically, at theit' reques:t, .I -respond to the scene of
various ci·imes in order to facilitate the

inv~_s:t:igat:J.on

or collection of

evidence.

My qualifications for my vocation ind\lde a fp,:-mal . educat.i~o, induding graduate
work in chemistry., as well as previous employment as .an analytical chemist for a
manufacturing pharmaceutical company.

Since 1980, I have been involved in the highly. spe<':.ial.ized area of clandestine,
or illegal drug synthesis and/or

labo~atories~

natural offshoot for me · due to my formttl

This area of criminalistics is a

ecuc.a~J.on.,

·p.revious employment and

extreme interest in the field.

Additionally, since 1981_, I have been involved in· :research in this area, with a
number of presentations to various professional scientific organizations to my
credit..

Also, since that time, I .have bt-t>n ~)[t:reme-ly .a ctive in training both

law enforcement and other criminalist& about clandestine synthesis and
clandestine laboratory investigation.

2

•
The "specialization" tag I put on this type of · investigation is well warranted.
Communication and coordination between the investigator and an experienced
chemist is extremely important due to the highly technical nature of the
investigation.

The chemist must be able to answer the following critical

questions:

1.

What type of drug is being produced?

2.

What time frame for the particular procedure are we dealing
with?

3.

. 4.

What safety measures should be taken?

What quantities of drug is the clandestine chemist capable of
manufacturing at the site?

These questions need to be answered as soon as possible for the investigator
both for establishing the proper documentation and statements from an expert
needed for writing and executing a valid search warrant as well as optimizing
the time for the seizure of the clandestine laboratory itself.

In order to answer these questions properly, a chemist

~

have both the

knowledge and experience in many types of clandestine syntheses.

The chemist

must have the ability, often with only the barest of clues, to decide which of
the many different methods the clandestine "cooker'' is utilizing to manufacture
the drug in question.

3

He has to have

~ad

practical experience in the synthesis of the drugs himself in

order to be able to recognize what reaction is in progress and how to handle it
safely. ·ue must know which items at a clandestine laboratory scene have
evidentiary value and which do not.

Since the chemist is the de facto safety

officer at laboratory scenes, he must· also know what items are unsafe and how to
handle them properly.

The challenge of

s.t~ying

current with clandestine "cookers" is an ongoing demand

due to the fact that with the· restriction or control of vat;ious chemicals, the
"cooker" must radically change hi~ known procedure to an entirely different
method with different chemicals in order to

successfu~ly

make the drug he wants.

Does this then meap that the "cooker" is a chemical genius, and can at his whim
change his procedure to fit whatever chemicals are at hand?
question is an emphatic HOt

The answer to that

Perhaps then," the costs involved in

set~ing

up a

clandestine laboratory are such that a natural economic limitation exists to
halt or at least sl.ow the growth of c.lan(Jestine laboratories.
simply

~ot

~ain,

that is

the case.

What I intend tci_ explain next is how little time, money and effort it takes to
manufacture a

numbel~

of different drugs. · It must be

know how much these drugs sell for on the "street".

under.st~od

that I don't

I feel, though, it can be

safely assumed that the profit margin is substantial.

Preceeding this, I must define five technical terms that I will be using.
are:

They

4
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1.

PREOJRSOR

This is a chemical that
procedure at hand.

~

be used in the specific

It becomes the "backbone" of the

drug substance.

This is a chemical that usually must ·be used in the

2.

specific procedure at hand, but s9metimes can be
substituted.

It usually does not become part of the

finished substance.

3.

SOLVENT

This is a chemical that can easily be substituted.

It

is a liquid used to dissolve materials, to aid in
separation or transfer.

It does not become part of

the finished drug.

4.

INTERMEDIATE

In a two-step procedure, this would be the form the
drug takes after the first step, but before the final
form.

5.

ANALOG

An analog is a chemical substance that exhibits a
minor modification of the root drug form, yet usually
exhibits a marked increase in the effect of the drug
(e.g., Fentanyl and 3-Methyl Fentanyl).

Phencyclidine, PCP, is the first drug substance I'll deal with.
parti~ularly

to make.
cnllPd PCC

This drug, a

potent psychoactive substance, is incredibly easy and inexpensive

It involves a two-step reaction with the formation of an intermediate
(1-Piperidino-~yclohexane

carbonitrile}, and

th~

coltversion of that

s
•
to PCP using a chemical solution called a·Grignard reagent.
the PCC is usually an overnight procedure,

whil~

reagent and the conversion of the PCC to PCP can

The synthesis of

the making of the Grignard
tak~

as little as one hour.

The normal apparatus used are 5-gallon white plastic buckets, broom.handles or
sticks (for stirring) and large kitchen sieves (for filtering).
i

The cost of the

chemicals and apparatus used can be as li·ttle as $50 - $70 to manufacture one
gallon of PCP.

This $50- $70 does not include the cost of . the critical

precursor piperidine.

Piperidine, though having many legitimate uses in the polymer industry, is
tightly controlled in the State of Califorttia and sells for extraordinarily
inflated prices when used clandestinely.

This drug substance has spawned three cottage industries.
make the PCC.
reagent.

One location will

'Another entirely different location will make the Grignard

They will come together at a third location to make the PCP.

Dangers of fire, explosion or· toxicity are found throughout this procedure.
Potassium pr sodium cyanide is used in making
substantial amount of cyanide.
throughout.

t~e

PCC, which itself contains a

Ether, a highly flammable material, is used

The Grignard reagent is a chemical liquid that is so reactive that

it can explode when exposed to water.

Methamphetamine, an extremely potent. stimulant, is by far the most popular drug
substance currently clandestinely manufactured.

Though at least seven

procedures have been seen. in California, only four are relatively common.

THE DANGERS -OF THE DESIGNER DRUG' PHENOMENQN
PREPARED

FO~

PRESENTATION TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON DRUG .AKD - ALCOHOL ABUSE
November 5, 1985
by
J. William Langs~on, M.D.
Direc~or~ Parkinson's· Research and Clinical Programs
The Insti~ute for Medical Research
and .
The Santa Clara Valley Medical Center

Senator Seymour and colleagu~s, ladies ~nd gentlemen Thank you for inviting me to testify today on the important
issue of "designer drugs".
I beli~le I may have . been the first
to testify on this issue at your - original hearing, which was held
on October 22, 1984. It is gratifying · to se~ that the level df
attention and interest by local, state and federal aut·horities
has gained . momentum since that time. The problem cont~nues to be
a potentially serious and ex_plosive one, a fact tha·t I'm sure you
are well aware of. As ._there are man) others here today who will
be discussing -in some detail th~ principles and concepts behind
"designer drugs", and the potential reasons for their growt_h, I
would like to focus on ~he medical hazards as a physician and as
the one who has had perhaps the most experience with "designer
drugs" which cripple and maim.
This experience began for us in 1982. At that time, I had
neither heard of the concept of "designer drugs", nor was I aware
that such · things were feasible.
In July of 1982, we began seeing
a series of young adults who had, literally overnight, become
frozen and unable to move. This was a dramatic and frightening
medical p.resentation, an.d I had never seen anything like it
previously. · Over a period of approximately three weeks, w·e
accumulated seven .such cases. These young people were unable to
speak, walk, or voluntarily move.
Some were · severely troubled by
tremor. Even more remarkable, their signs and sy~ptoms resembled
those of severe Parkinson's disease, a syndrome that we usually
see only in aged individuals. As part of this testimony I will
be showing a v~deotape to illustrate the condition these p~tients
were in.
·
The discovery of these cases, and the fact that the onlr,
common link between ~hem was ~he use of "synthetic" oi ~new'
heroin, set off an intensive investlgatfon to track down the
offending agent. This effort eventually led us to the Lane
Medical Library at Stanford to search for a 1947 paper by Albert
Ziering and colleagues describing the synthesis of a synthetic
narcotic which belongs to the same family as Demerol, a
frequently used analgesic. For short, I will call this compound
MPPP. Much to our amazement, this article had been very
carefully razor-bladed out of the Stanford Medical Libra~y as
were several other relevant articles. We now know that an
individual (who we have heard holds a law degree) had done a

careful literature search looking for a narcotic which was both
uncontrolled (i.e, legal to possess) and easy to synthesize.
MPPP met both of these criteria. We now know that this compound
was synthesized in a garage laboratory and sold on the streets of
northern California as "synthetic heroin". We further know that
this individual eventually made a bad batch of "synthetic heroin"
which contained almost pure MPTP, a by-product of synthesis of
MPPP. Either too much heat or acid produces this compound which
we now know to be one of the most potent neurotoxins ever
described. This compound crosses into the brain and selectively
destroys nerve cells in the brain which are responsible for
movement. These nerve cells are located in an area called the
substantia nigra and happen to be the very same cells which die
in Parkinson's disease. This latter effect expla~ns why these
patients look so much as if they had Parkinson's disease. This
damage to the nervous system is permanent and many of these young
people are in a rather precarious and critical condition in terms
of management of their medical care. Further, we have no w
identified over 400 individuals who may hav~ been exposed to•this
compound, raising the spectre of an epidemic of Parkinson's ·
disease in the future. We now spend a fair amount of time just
trying to regulate medications of the more severely affected
people and in attempting to locate and follow those who we think
are at risk.
We believe this represents the first "designer drug
disaster", something which one might have predicted could occur
based on the principles involved.
I believe there are three
major medical hazards to the "designer drug" approach, a
phenomenon which we fear may spread for reasons that I'm sure you
will be hearing repeatedly today. The first hazard relates to
the synthesis of a new compound which is destined for human use.
Anytime a legitimate drug company makes a new compound they are
required to carry out studies on it in animals for years before
taking it to humans. In the case of designer drugs, the process
is almost instantaneous, in that after a new compound is
synthesized the first animals to be subjected to its effects are
human. In other words, addicts are in essence being treated as
human guinea pigs. If these "illicit chemists" and the addicts
are fortunate, the new compound will be ·safe, and non-toxic.
However, there is no way of predicting when one of these new
analogues will turn out to be a poison. Secondly, these
laboratories never have quality controls. A legitimate
pharmaceutical company, of course, has to carefully monitor the
quality of the products they make. On the other hand these
"kitchen chemists" rarely, if ever, have the analytic equipment
available to see if their compounds are pure. This is, in fact,
what happened with MPTP. The third major problem is the potency
of the new "designer drugs", something I'm sure you will hear
more in detail about from Dr. Henderson.
I'm gratified to see these hearings being held because the
time to act is now. Although the first "designer drug disaster"
has indeed occurred, one can hope by taking a multi-faceted
approach, further such problems might be avoided.
In regard to what steps might be taken to combat this

potentially serious social and public health ~~oblem, I would
offer the following suggestions:
1. The drafting of new legislation to try to remove the
incentive of being able to -make "legal" narcotic substitutes
has already occurred in the state of California. I would
urge that an on~going effort be init~ated to assess the
effect of this legislation~ so ·that ways to modify and
improve upon what has already_ been done can take place on an ·
ongoing basis.
2. If future medica~ hazar4s are to be addressed, a careful
monitoring pr·ogram must be carried out. We have attempted an
active intervention progiam usi~g an "anonymous sample"
program, co~bined with· considerable publicity to notify
addicts that they coqld get the drugs they're usin~ tested.
While we have collected over _ 80 samples through this program,
I feel that by and large it has proved an ineff~cient and
inadequate way to fin4 out what is being sold on the streets.
The only avenue I know at present is ~o develop and ·support
an intensive monitorin~ program to assess the content of
samples of drug~. Such samples could come from a co~bination
of those garnered in arrests and drug raids, ~s- well as
street buys. An active and .o n-going· "street buy" prog-ram,
I'm beginning to believe, is the only . way to accurately
monitor . what new compounds are being made and sold as street
drugs.
Such a monitoring program should represent a statewide
network, such that new drugs can be quickly identified and
word transmitted throughout the state: T~is will require a
central and sophisticated labora~ory, capable of identifying
new compounds as well as those already discovered.
3. Biological testing for new compounds. This laboratory
should have the capability to carry out biological testing of
new compounds ~o test for toxicity. Those which are ·toxic
could quickly be identified and appropriate w~rnings could be
posted. If another MPTP-like disaster could be avoided, the
financial saYings c~uld : be ertormo~s • . We estimate one patient
alone, requiring full time nursing care, could cost the'state
between $20,000 and $30 ,-ooo pe-r year.

4.

The · development of screening procedures for well defined
designer drugs.
Once compounds were idehtified and elearly
establfshed to be cons_tantly pr'oduced for street consumption,
a· third responsibility of this laboratory might be to develop
screening procedures so local authorities could easily check
for either the compounds or their metabolites in samples and
biological fluids.
5. The 4evelopment of a consultation team that could respond
immediately when new designer drug disasters are- identifi~d.
Such a team might be comprized of a representative from a
·
toxicology laboratory, an internist, a neurologist acquainted
with the nervous system effects of these drugs, and perhaps
someone at the State_ level to coordinate this effort. Such a

team could quickly respond and evaluate new designer drug
problems.
6. Establishing a study of the "drug designer disaster"
which has already occurred. We are, in essence, in the
position of dealing with the many young addicts who were
affected or potentially affected by MPTP. We strongly
believe a comprehensive study of precisely how this
"epid~mic" occurred, and both the short term and long term
consequences of such a potential health hazard, would be very
valuable in learning to deal with future such episodes. We
desperately need funding assistance to care for those
patients already severely damaged as well as to identify and
follow those who maybe at risk. The epidemiological benefit
- of initiating such a study is that it could allow us to
develop techniques for studying future such problems. One
good example of this is the drug intervention program. This
came out of the study of MPTP Parkinson patients and, I
think, it has taught us that an active intervention program
with anonymous sampling may be only moderately effective.
This could save time and effort in the future.
The foregoing represent only a preliminary set of
which I hope this committee will find of some
value in responding to the designer drug problem. Again, I
would emphasize that a central laboratory that could monitor
all of these problems and establish a communications network
with local and state authorities is central to identifying
and dealing with this problem, as well as monitoring and
assessing the effectiveness of various forms of legislation
which are in place or being planned to deal with this
problem.
suggest~ons

Again, thank you for the opportunity of testifing for this
committee.
Respectfully submitted,

J. William Langston, MD

November 5. 1985
----------------------------·------------------------~----------

1 wish to thank Senator Seymour and the Committee for its invitation to
.
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participate 1n this Hearing on Clandestine Laboratories. It appears from
looking at the witness list that you have selected people who are very
know1edgeable and aware of the problem. In the letter I received from Senator
Seymour, I was asked to discuss the P.C.P. problem in the Los Angeles area
along with the export of P.C.P. through our Los Angeles International Airport.
The P.C.P. problem in Los Angeles continues to be a major concern which a few
years ago led us to the unfortunate title of the. P~C.P. c~pital of the United
States. We managed to earn.this t~tle as the criminal element discovered
~hat the necessary chemica~s to produce t·his drug were. easily ~nd legally
purchased in our own state. What we ·were faced with then was that a person
could, for a few hundred dollars, turn his investment ;nto thousands of dollars
of profit without taking the normal smugglers risk of.·crossing national and
state borders.
In recent years ..one of the major precursors of P.C.P. was placed on the
restricted list and most chem;cal companies discontinued its sales. The
criminals, however, countered this move by purchasing this chemical out of
state and then transporting it back to Los ·Angeles where business continued
as usual.
In Los Angeles the principal manufacturers of P.C.P. come from the ~lack areas
of South Los Angeles and the hispani.c areas of East Los An~eles. With regards
to South Los Angeles. we have foun~ that several loose knit organizations have
formed to produce and sell this fonn of. death not only in Los Angeles, but to
other cities throughout the United States. As to their method of operation,
we have found that the people involved. once they have acquired the necessary
chemicals. transport said chemicals to t.he more remote . are~s of Los Angeles,
San Bernardino, Riverside and Kern Counties where they· compl~te the manufacturing process. Once completed, the finished product is ret1.1rned to Los
Angeles where it is distributed to var1ous .mid-1eve1 dealers and then to the
streets.

( 1)

.

- The remo~e areas are used, in my opinion, for two reasons. One 1s to lessen
the chances of discovery due to the strong chemical odors associated with the
manufacturing process and secondly these remote areas generally receive
minimal law enforcement. coverage.

As to the activities of our Airport Detail at Los Angeles lnternation Airport
as it applies to the export of P.c.P •• I am aware of four separate seizures
of Phencyclidine so far this year. Two of these were of major violator
significance 1n that the seizures were -of multiple gallons and were ticketed
to cities in the east. It should be pointed out that while an ounce of P.C.P.
sells for between one hundred and fifty to two hundred dollars in Los Angeles
that same ounce will sell for five hundred dollars in Washington D.C. or New
York. When P.C.P. is shipped through our airport it is generally shipped in
glass jars or in gallon size gasoline c~ns. Recently I was told of an incident
which occurred on an airline where a container of P.C.P. allegedly broke open
while the plane was in flight and ~orne of the passengers experienced some of
it•s effects.
This Committee _s!lould-..consider adding legislation to severely penalize any
person found gui_lty of using a comnon carrier, airplane, train or bus to
ship or transport P:C.P. It makes one shudder to think of the potential
disaster which could be brought about by a spillage on board an airplane.
At this point I would like to take a few moments to tell you a story which has
h~d a marked impact on the P.C.P. traffic in the Los Angeles area.
In the
early part of 1985, my squad ini-tiated an investigation into the activities
of a retail chemical company which we suspected of selling restricted chemicals
to various illicit manufacturers of both P.C.P. and Methamphetamine. Within
ninety days we were able to prove our suspicions were well founded. During
this period we learned that this particular company was the largest outlet
for five gallon containers of ether in the entire United States. Due to the
possible far reaching effects of this investigation, we invited the California
Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (B.N.E.) and the Drug Enforcement Administration
(D.E.A.) to join with us in this investigation. The merger and subsequent
investigation led to obtaining a federal wire tap. The evidence obtained from
this investigation has enabled us to close down the entire company which had
outlets not only in Los Angeles, but in San._Bernardino and Ventura Counties.
(2)

For the first time in ~ twenty-five year career I have been able to see an
impact in the trafficking of a particular drug. Since the closing of this
company, my unit has handled only three P.C.P. lab call-outs and in one of
the casea, the chemicals came from northern California. I am certainly not
nai_v' en.ough to believe that we have stopped the manufacturing of P.C.P. in
Los Angeles but for the time being we certainly have slowed it down.
Unfortunately, as long as there 1s a demand, someone will find a way to supply
that demand.
During my career with the Los Angeles Police Department. J have been an
unfortunate witness to the ruination of a large and still growing segment
of the population of the 2nd largest city in the United States. I have
spoken with all too many people who have lost members of their families to
drugs including P.c.P. Believe me, anyone who says that the use of narcotics
is a victimless crime should be made to speak to these families.
In closing, I would like to say that through the years I have developed a
rather jaundiced view of the California legal system, including the·1egislation
coming out of.~~~ra~. to. It has only been very recently, with the enactment
of the 1984 Asset Seizure Law that I have begun to think that our state
government is beginning t~ take the drug problem seriously. However we
all still have a long and tough road ahead.
Gentlemen, thank you.
Michael J. Murphy, Sergeant
Lab Squad .
Los Angeles Police Department
Narcotics Division
251 E. 6th Street
Los Angeles, Ca 90014
O.I.C./Cland~stine

213) '485-4504
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My name is John M. Zajac, and I am a Special Agent with the _
United States Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
I h~ve been a Special Agent with DEA for five
years, during _- four ~f which my primary respqnsibilit~ has been
the investigation of clandestine drug labo~atories. I h•ve .a
Bachelor of Science degre~ f~om San biego · s~ate University, and
for the four years prior to becoming a Special Agent, I was a
forensic Chemist, .also with DEA. A~ a foren~ic · Chemist and as a
Special · Agent; .I have participated in the in~estigation of well
over 100 clandestine drug labo~ator.ies throughout the southwest,
and in particular, in San Di~go County.
According to statistics kept by the DEA Southwest Laboratory
: here in National City, Callfornia,- in 1982 there were six clande~
tine laboratories seized in San Diego County, in 1983 there wer~
three such seizures, and in 19~4 there were nine clandestine
laboratory seizures.
In 1984,-!·the San Diego field Division of
. the Drug Enforcement Administration recogniz~d that there wa~ a
growing problem in the San Diego area regarding clandestine drug
laboratories. The San Diego field Division believed that the
incr-: easing number of quasi-.).egit-imate chemica1 supply houses in
the San Diego area would generate a~.:increase
in -the availability
1
of the precursor chemicals n~cess ary ;.:manu facture i 11 i cit drugs.
In response to the situation, in early 1984 the San Diego
field Division establlshed its-Clandestine ~aboratory Group. This
group was a collection of DEA Special Agents and a·california
St~te Bureau of . Narcotic Enfotcement Agent, .all with special
expertise in clandestine labor~tory investigations. The purpose
of this Group was to investigate the extent -of the . clandestine
l_abor atory problem in San Diego County, to· coo rd in ate the i 11 i cit
d"rug laboratory investi'gati've efforts of the San Diego Drug
Enforcement Administration and the San Diego Narcotic Task force,
and to make clandestine drug laboratory seizures in San Diego
County. It should be noted that the Narcotic Task Force is a
cooperative -p-oo+ing of narcotics investigators from the various
police agericies~ in San Diego, including local, state and DEA
narcotics agents • . This organization is co-located with the DEA
offices in National City. As a result of the increased ·clandestine laboratory investigative efforts, in federal fiscal year
1 9 8 5 ( i. e • f r om 0 c to be r 1 , 1 9 B4 t h rough S e ~em b e r 3 0 , 1 9 8 5 )
forty-six illicit drug laboratories were se-i"zed in San Diego
County. Each of these laboratories was a methamphetamine
manufacturing operation. Evidence obtained in investigating these
operations irrdicated that the suppliers of the precursor chemicals and equipment to these_drug laboratories were the quasilegitimate chemical supply houses based here in San Diego County.

-~

1

This brings me to the crux of the illicit drug laboratory
problem in the San Diego area; the clandestine manufacture of
methamphetamine. In San Diego County there are several small
chemical supply houses - from which anyone, with no questions
asked, can purchase illicit drug precursor chemicals. At least
two of these chemical companies rely almost exclusively upon
walk-in retail customers.
To point out the magnitude of the problem, let me discuss
the primary precursor chemical for methamphetamine as it is made
in the San Diego area. Almost all of the clandestine methamphetamine manufacturers in San Diego use a process called the
"Ephedrine Reduction" method. Ephedrine is a precursor chemical
which is an analog of methamphetamine. By analog I mean that the ·
chemical structure of ephedrine is almost identical of that of
methamphetamine. By a very si~ple one-step chemical process,
ephedrine is converted into methamphetamine. The ephedrine
reduction method will theorectically yield an identical
amount of methamphetamine for the amount of ephedrine used; that
is, ~ne pound of ephedrine would yield one pound of methamphetamine~
The only known legitimate use for ephedrine is in pharmaceutical over-the-counter respiratory preparations. When so
employed, ephedrine is used in milligram amounts. Our investigation into the activities of some of these quasi-legitimate
chemical companies has revealed that, using one of them as an
example, over a two year period it ordered over ten thousand
pounds of ephedrine for re-sale. This equates to ten thousand
pounds of methamphetamine. Moreover, an employee of this same
chemical company testified in court that all of his customers
were walk-in customers and that the company did no outside sales.
This chemical company has been a source of supply for precursor
chemicals and laboratory equipment not only in San Diego and
el~ewhere in California, but for clandestine methamphetamine
laboratories in operations in other states as well. Large scale
clandestine methamphetamine laboratories, and by this I mean in :
the hundreds of~pounds, haye been seized in Oregon, Montana~
South Dakota, Indiana, Texas and also in Mexico. Again, each one
of these operations was supplied by a chemical company here in
San Diego, and again, this is just one of several
quasi-legitimate chemical supply houses.
-~
I would next like to discuss the evolution of the methamphetamine manufacturing process here in San Diego. Years
ago, befdre it became controlled, virtually all methamphetamine

2

was _manufactured by using the precursor chemical phenyl-2propanone, or P2P for short. Wheri this chemical came under
federal and st~te control, methamp~etamine manufacturers just
took one step backwards in the . ch~mical process. This next
process invo 1 ved the use of the p r ·ecursor .chemical pheny 1 acetic
acid. With phenylacetic ac~d, .a cla~destine laboratory operator
would use one simple process to turn phenylacetic ~cid into
phenyl-2-propanone, and then on to methamphetamine. Meanwhile,
in the late 70s, the ephedrine reduction process was begun to be
used here in San Diego. · By · th~ time the state had mandated the
reporting requirement for all sales for phenylacetic acid, the
ephedrine reduction method was in full swing in San Diego. As a
result, quaai-legitimate ch~mical supply houses in San Diego jus
quit selling any state reportable item, and c~ncentrated their
sales on the · non-reportable ch,eml.cals involved in the ephedrine·
reductioh pracess. Today, the~e ar~ rumors amorig the clandestine
drug laboratory u~d~rground th~t ephedrine may soon come under
state coMtrol; and that alternative methods will have to be found
for the clandestine m~nufacture of .methamphetamine. One of
theae methods involves the .precursor chemical benzyl cyanide.
Just within the last few months, we have seized twb clandestine
laboratories in San Diego, which involve this precursor chemical.
In the opinion of narcotic enforcement officers in San Di~go
County, controlling individual · precursor chemicals may be an
effective - stop-gap measure, but it will not solve the long term
p r o b 1 em • · A.s i s e v ide n c e d by o u r i n v est i g at i on s i n t .h i s co u n t y ,
and as is shown by the progression in various methods of methamphetamine manufacture, illicit drug manufacturers will continu~
~o find new routes to manufacture ·their product, in order to
.
~void using · controlled precursors.
In our opinion, the only way
to control th~ clandestine laboratory situation is for the state
to take a two _fold legislative action: first, control the
availability of precursor · chemical~ through th~ control of
chemical .supply. house·; and s_econdly, control the purchasers of
precursor chemic~ls.
To this end~ we recommend that through the State Bureau of
Narcotic Enforcement, the Attorney General establish a precursor
che~ic;al "Watch Li ~ t '·' .
So. as not to becom~ a bur de~ on
leg1t1mate enterpr1ses, th1s Watch List would conta1n as few
chemicals as possible; that is, i~ would only contain the one
primary precursor chemical for any given illicit drug manufa c t u r i n g p r o c e s s • We f u r t h e r r e co m.men d that t h is Wat c h Li s t be
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updated every year, and that the Attorney General have authorization to place precursor chemicals on this Watch List on an
emergency basis prior to the annual Watch List updating review.
Chemical companies would then be required to obtain appropriate
identification, preferably a state registration number ., from
purchasers of these Watch List chemicals and furthermore,
chemical companies would be required to report the sale of these
chemicals to the state. Additionally, provision should be made
to enable narcotics enforcement agencies to audit chemical
companies' books when deemed necessary. In case it may be
believed that a precursor Watch List and reporting requirement would be an unnecessary burden to levy upon chemical supply
houses, let me point out that there are very few of these
quasi-legitimate supply houses which even deal in precursor
chemicals. Specifically, let me quote three legitimate chemical
supply houses here in San Diego County which have in the past
routinely cooperated with us regarding the sale of watch list
type precursor chemicals. When presented with a list of chemical~, one of the companies told us that they do not sell those
chemicals, nor would they ever sell them because "only drug
dealers buy them". Another company told us that they had not
sold any of those listed chemicals because of problems of selling
to retail customers ''particularly drug dealers". The third
company told us that they did not sell to retail customers, and
that if one of their business customers wanted to purchase any of
those watch list chemicals and could not show a legitimate use
for those chemicals, then that business would be required
to obtain DEA permission to purchase those watch list chemicals.
Contrasting this, when DEA went to one of the quasi-legitimate
Chemical companies in an attempt to gain their cooperation, an
employee of that company immediately telephoned the company's
attorney, and was told by that attorney that he was orde~ing the
employees "not to cooperate with the government".
The seconq_approach we see toward controlling the illicit
manufacture of ~rugs in California is to ~ontrol the purchasers
of precursor chemicals. We see this step as necessary because we
have been finding more and more, that clandestine laboratory
operators have been using what we call "runners" to obtain their
chemicals for them. These runners may or ~y not know of the
existence of the illicit dryg laboratory, and may or may not be
willing participants in the operation. We have found that some
of these runners were teenagers, or elderly men and women, who
are asked by their friend (and unbeknownst laboratory operator)
4

to run an errand. The errand would usually be to go to a
chemical supply house and pick up an order. The runner would then
be pai~ $50.00 to $200.00 for doing this favor. By controlling,
through registration, 'who may purchase the highly specialized
chemicals on a Watch . List, we may control the distribution of
precursor chemicals throughout the state. This registration
would not be overly burdensome on legitimate consumers of the
specialized use precursor chemicals. For instance·, the only
legitimate use for ephedrine· is in pharmaceutical preparations.
Since most pharmaceutical companies are already registrants for
moie stringently controlled substances, this registration is
nothing more than the registration which they already have
any-way. Additionally, legitimate business enterprises who have
need for Watch · List type ch emi c:al s would not buy them from lac al
small businesses. As we have fb~nd in our investigation into the
national distribution of ephedrine_, legitimate consumers of this
chemical buy it in bulk from national distributors, at wholesale
prices.
lastly, we have a suggestion regarding the environmental
hazards posed by clandestine drug laboratories.
It is virtually
unknown to seize an illicit drug manufacturing operation where
waste products are properly disposed. Furthermore, at any
clandestine drug iaboratory site, there are always a myriad of
hazardous chemicals present. As a matter of public safety, we
routinely pay for a hazardous waste disposal company to c~me to
the site and dispose of these chemicals. A single disposal
operation may cost the government thousands of dollars.
It is
our recommendation that as part of sentencing, clandestine
laboratory operators be required to reimburse the government for
the cost of the clean up.
In conclusion, we believe that the measures outlined above,
should enable na_rcotics enforcem~nt agencies to gain significant
control of the cilandestine drug laboratory problem in California.
A chemical Watch List, coupled with mandatory ch~mical company
cooperation, would control the availability of illicit drug
precursors in California. The registration of precursor chemical
consumers, along with significant sanctions~or possession of
precursors without registration, would have the additional
benefit of aiding in contral·' af precursor chemicals purchased out
of state, and brought ·into California for the purpose of
manufacturing illicit drugs • .
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Senator Seymour, Committee Members,
.
.
My name is Karen Dallosta and I am ·representing the Western States Information

Network, commonly referred to by it$ acronym, WSIN. _ WSIN is a federally funded
multi-state narcotic intelligence agency. My duties there include maintaining intelligence
information on clandestine drug

manuf~cturers.

In 1983, at the request of Attorney

General .Van de Kamp, I began keeping statistical data on the number and types of
clandestine drug laboratories that ·w ere seized .in California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska
and Hawaii.

The Drug Enforcement

statistics on illicit labs.

Admin~tration

was the only agency gathering

Problems were encountered while gathering this information

such as defining wha_t a clandestine drug laboratory is and dealing with lack of voluntary
reporting. Neither of these

p~obl~ms

has been satisfactorily

resolv~d.

DEA has set up

-a classification s_y stem as a guideline for the definition of what is and· what is not a
laboratory, using -terms such as operational, dismantled, in storage and in production.
WSIN

has no set definition for a clE.mdestine laboratory but generally require that a

seized laboratory must be operational or in· production to be counted.

In other words,

there must be both chemicals and equipment used to manufacture controlled substances at the laboratory site. We use this definition to avoid double reporting. For example,
if chemicals are found in a storage shed and chemicals and glassware are found in a
house, this is considered one laboratory.

WSIN relies on voluntary reporting by local, ~tate and federal agenci~s that seize
laboratories.

Additionally

we

coordinate

Administration and the California Attorney
and Bureau of Forensic Services.

with

the Federal ·Drug

.Ge~eral's

Enforcement

B·ureau of Narcotic Enforcement

We also subscribe to a newspaper clipping service

which provides additional information on the. number of clandestin.e laboratories seized.
This information is entered in a computer and the data is then examined for trends
which can be used in an

investigativ~ -

fashio_n.

Although some lack of reporting is

inevitable and actual numbers may vary slightly, the figures are consistent with trends
reported by Federal, State and local agencies nationwide. This y·ear to date, WSIN has
received reports of 175 clandestine drug laboratories seized in California. This is over
three times the number of laboratories reported seized in 1980.

Most sources agree

that there are two to three operational clandestine laboratories for every one lab that
is shut down.

Not only are there more laboratories being discovered each year in

California, but the average laboratory is producing more drugs at a much higher purity
level.

Methamphetamine is a good example of this trend. In 1983, the average meth

laboratory produced an estimated 11 pounds a week, in 1984, the figure increased to
16 pounds a week and this year, the average methamphetamine laboratory produces 24
pounds of finished product each week. The illicit chemists that are running these labs
are becoming more experienced and sophisticated, occasionaly holding advanced college
degrees in chemistry!

Additionally, new techniques and chemical formulas that don't

require the use of reportable precursors are making it more difficult to catch these
chemists.

This is especially true in Southern California where the majority of

methamphetamine laboratories use ephedrine as the essential precursor chemical.
Ephedrine yields a high quality product without some of the odors that have traditionally
been associated with methamphetamine manufacture.

Since ephedrine can be sold

legally and without reporting sales to the California Attorney General's Office, many
chemical companies sell ephedrine to illicit laboratory operators for inflated prices.•
Legitimately, ephedrine sells for $15.00 to $20.00 per pound. However, methamphetamine
manufacturers pay up to $175.00 per pound.

Chemical companies that knowingly sell

to clandestine laboratory operators are getting rich off of their business.

Statistically, we can even give a profile of an average methamphetamine manufacturer.
He is a white male and may be well educated or has spent time learning chemistry
from an experienced cooker.

Often times, this chemistry lesson takes place in prison

where formulas and techniques are passed around between inmates.

He may have ties

. to outlaw motorcycle gangs who will provide him with precursor chemicals, protection
and a ready market · for the finished product. This cooker will pick an isolated area for
his laboratory, where the threat from law enforcement is usually the least. This week
he will make approximately 24 pounds of high quality methamphetamine which he will
sell for about $500,000.00!

Phencyclidine or PCP laboratories are also increasing at a pheonomenal rate.

To date,

there have been twice as many PCP laboratories· seized this year· than for all .of 1984.
.

'

'

Each laboratory on the average produces

thre~

and · a half times more PCP than last

year. This means that approximately seven times more· PCP is now reacning the street
from illicit laboratories.

Ttle average PCP manufacturer is a black male.

He will

often use a three step formula and complete each part in a different location.
Frequently, he will use motel rooms or urban area houses. This is extremely unfortunate
because PCP precursor chemicals are among the most toxic chemicals used in illicit
laboratories.

They include two chemicals which, if mixed together, will form deadly

cyanide gas.

Occasionally, the PCP cooker will dump waste from his laboratory on

the gound in an is.o lated area, contaminating the environment. This week he will make
24 gallons of PCP -and sell this dangerous liquid for

The picture

doesn~t

approxi~ately

$2.50,000.00 • .

get any brighter when you consider the ·other drugs that are produced

daily in California.

Seizures this year to date include seven cocaine labs, one

methaqualone lab, two hash oil labs and two fentanyl labs.

F~

in excess of 100 million

dollars worth of these drugs have been produced · in California already this year.
California has the dubious distinction of being the soQrce state for one of the most
dangerous drugs known to man, fentanyl. Although this is the first year that a fentanyl
laboratory has been seized, it appears inevitable that synthetic opiates such as fentanyl

will continue to gain popularity due to -the questionable legality and high profit margin
associated with the manufacture of designer drugs. The final and oft_en overlooked
problem associated with clandestine drug laboratories is the amount of hazardous waste
that must be disposed of.

Law enforcement officers are required by law to properly

package and dispose of all hazardous waste.

This. amounts to a tremendous monetary

. burden on local agencies who do not budget for this unexpected expense. -So far this
year 274 drums of hazardous waste have been removed from clandestine laboratories
in Northern California at a cost in excess of $45,000.00. In 1984, the Attorney General's
Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement spent $39,000.00 on the removal and disposal of
potentially hazardous laboratory waste. Additionally, BNE is taxed by the State Board
of Equalization as a generator of hazardous waste.

Unfortunately, the estimated 400

operational laboratories that are not seized do not follow the rules for waste disposal.
Sludge from these labs is often dumped in open fields or in lakes and streams where
contamination will remain for years.

As you ·can see, the clandestine laboratory problem is growing at a tremendous rate.
In the last five years, DEA has reported the seizure of 1181 clandestine ch-ug laboratories

nationwide. California has accounted for 2596 of those reported seizures. In the first
ten months of this year there have been 7596 more labs reported seized.
laboratories are much larger than those seen in the past.

And these

What this means is that .

California is rapidly establishing itself as the producer of domestically manufactured
controlled substances.

Obviously additional legislation, resources and manpower are

needed to combat this ever-increasing and potentially lethal problem.

Mr. Chairman, members, I am honored to have been invited to speak before this
Committee, I hope that my comments have been helpful and I would now be happy to
answer any questions you may have.

